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COLLECTIVE COGNITIVE CAPITAL

EMILY R.D. MURPHY*
ABSTRACT
This Article calls for a new project for law and neuroscience. It
outlines a structural, not individual, application of brain and
behavioral science that is aligned with the general goal of basic
science research: improving the lives of citizens with a better understanding of the human experience. It asks brain and behavioral
science to move explicitly into public policy territory, and specifically
onto ground more traditionally occupied by economists—but in ways
the project of “behavioral economics” has not yet ventured. Put simply, policy analysts should focus on brains—“collective cognitive
capital”—with the same intensity with which they focus on money,
rights, or other policy metrics.
To that end, this Article introduces and explores the novel
framework of “collective cognitive capital”: a way of thinking of brain
health and brain function as an aggregated resource. Collective
cognitive capital is a conceptual framework for synthesizing brain
and behavioral data and using it to assess the impacts of policy
choices. The core thesis for this future of “law and neuroscience” is
simple: we can and should use brain and behavioral science to
evaluate public policy decisions by how they affect the brain functioning of the people. Normatively, policies should seek to maximize
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
Thanks to Teneille Brown, Ryan Calo, David Faigman, Martha Farah, Dave Owen, Reuel
Schiller, Jodi Short, participants in the University of Utah Law and Biosciences Colloquium,
participants in the Symposium that gave rise to this issue, the participants in the UCLA
Program in Understanding Law Science and Evidence symposium, participants in the
Vanderbilt Law School Behavioral Law and Economics Conference, and my colleagues at UC
Hastings participating in junior faculty and works in progress workshops for this longgenerating idea.
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“collective cognitive capital” because it is inherently valuable.
Cognitive and emotional functioning, and overall brain health,
subserve and maximize individual agency and freedom.
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INTRODUCTION
This Symposium issue asks: What is the future of neuroscience in
the law? Some scholars imagine technologically sophisticated futures of brain implants and mind reading, raising concerns about
mental privacy and state intervention.1 Others imagine perfect (or
good enough) prediction of behavior, or forensic fact development for
the courtroom.2 Many return to fundamental challenges to common
law notions of personhood and responsibility.3 A handful have suggested larger structural changes in legislation, legal categories, and
political understanding of how particular groups of people behave
and are classified by the state.4 But what if the future of law and
1. See, e.g., Sjors Ligthart, Freedom of Thought in Europe: Do Advances in ‘BrainReading’ Technology Call for Revision?, 7 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES, Jan.-June 2020, at 1, 3-5; Paul
Sheldon Davies, Foundational Facts for Legal Responsibility: Human Agency and the Aims
of Restorative Neurointerventions, in NEUROINTERVENTIONS AND THE LAW: REGULATING
HUMAN MENTAL CAPACITY 319 (Nicole A. Vincent et al. eds., 2020); Nita A. Farahany, The
Costs of Changing Our Minds, 69 EMORY L.J. 75 (2019); Gerben Meynen, Brain-Based Mind
Reading in Forensic Psychiatry: Exploring Possibilities and Perils, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 311
(2017); Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239 (2012). But see Emily
R. Murphy & Henry T. Greely, What Will Be the Limits of Neuroscience-Based Mindreading
in the Law?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS 635 (Judy Illes & Barbara J.
Sahakian eds., 2011).
2. See, e.g., Emily R. D. Murphy & Jesse Rissman, Evidence of Memory from Brain Data,
7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES Jan.-June 2020, at 1; Owen D. Jones & Anthony D. Wagner, Law and
Neuroscience: Progress, Promise, and Pitfalls, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 1015 (David
Poeppel et al. eds., 6th ed. 2020); Kent A. Kiehl et al., Age of Gray Matters: Neuroprediction
of Recidivism, 19 NEUROIMAGE: CLINICAL 813 (2018); Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience,
Mindreading, and the Courts: The Example of Pain, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 171 (2015);
Christopher Slobogin, Bioprediction in Criminal Cases, in BIOPREDICTION, BIOMARKERS, AND
BAD BEHAVIOR: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES 77 (Ilina Singh et al. eds.,
2014); Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and
Lessons, 62 MERCER L. REV. 861 (2011).
3. But see Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for
Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837 (2011); Michael S. Moore, Responsible Choices, DesertBased Legal Institutions, and the Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience, 29 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 233 (2012).
4. See, e.g., A.C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How Pain Neuroimaging
Can Inform the Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1099 (2015); Stacey A. Tovino, Will Neuroscience Redefine Mental Injury? Disability Benefit Law, Mental Health Parity Law, and Disability Discrimination Law, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 695 (2015); Francis X. Shen, Legislating Neuroscience: The Case of Juvenile Justice, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 985 (2013); Emily R.D. Murphy,
Brains Without Money: Poverty as Disabling, 54 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4-5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3893856 [https://perma.
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neuroscience is in some ways much less high tech or movie scriptworthy, and still affects vastly more people and makes use of a
much broader swath of brain and behavioral science research? What
if the application of brain science to law aimed to improve society
through brain-prioritizing policy, rather than through one-off
adjudication, private deployment of technology, or direct brain
interventions in individuals?
This Article calls for a new project for “law and neuroscience.” It
outlines structural, not individual, application of brain science. That
is, aligned with the general goal of basic science research into brain
mechanisms and behavioral outcomes: improving the lives of
citizens with a better understanding of the human experience. It
asks brain and behavioral science5 to move explicitly into public
policy territory, and specifically onto ground more traditionally
occupied by economists—but in ways the project of “behavioral
economics” has not yet ventured. Put simply, policy analysts should
focus on brains—“collective cognitive capital”—with the same
intensity with which they focus on money, rights, or other policy
metrics.
To that end, this Article introduces and explores the novel framework of “collective cognitive capital”: a way of thinking of brain
health and brain function as an aggregated resource. Collective
cognitive capital is a conceptual framework for synthesizing brain
and behavioral data and using it to assess the impacts of policy
choices. It is analogous to a measure of welfare, a maximizable
metric used to evaluate policy choices.
The core thesis for this future of “law and neuroscience” is simple:
we can and should use brain and behavioral science to evaluate
public policy decisions by how they affect the cognitive (and emotional) functioning of the people. Normatively, policies should seek
to maximize collective cognitive capital because it is inherently

cc/844Y-FG2A].
5. I do not separate “neuroscience” from “behavioral” research for the purposes of
considering the future of neuroscience in law, notwithstanding that behavioral sciences have
made many separate inroads to law already. Behavioral research alongside manipulation of
neural mechanisms is essential to understanding brain functions, particularly complex brain
functions such as cognition. See Yael Niv, The Primacy of Behavioral Research for
Understanding the Brain, 135 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 601 (2021).
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valuable. Cognitive and emotional functioning, and overall brain
health, subserve and maximize individual agency and freedom.
The timing for a concept like this is ripe. Collective cognitive
capital builds on important ideas from development and health
economics, including the capabilities approach.6 Important for the
audience of this special issue, it also brings behavioral and brain
science into dialogue with law and policy in ways that have not yet
been attempted in “law and behavioral economics.”
Collective cognitive capital is a framework that shifts the focus
of policy inquiry. In the applied program of law and behavioral
economics, individuals’ behavior is the object or target. It imports
paternalistic ideas about how individuals should make decisions to
maximize their welfare—given their assumed shortcomings in
decision-making, which itself is a narrow version of cognitive capacity—within the existing political economy status quo. In contrast, the target in the framework of collective cognitive capital is
the policy, rule, or institutional design and its effect on collective
cognitive capital. The question is whether that rule or institution
consumes more cognitive capital than necessary, or promotes
development and preservation of cognitive capital. Unlike law and
behavioral economics, which seek to “improve” individual decisionmaking, the political economy status quo is up for reevaluation
under the rubric of collective cognitive capital.7
The framework of collective cognitive capital has the potential to
engage policymakers in familiar territory. It offers coherent descriptive and normative accounts for policy making. It provides a
concrete lens to focus on structural and contextual effects of policy
6. Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 31 (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000). Economics literature has only in the past
decade begun to merge literature on the human capital approach to health economics (focused
on early developmental factors on adult health outcomes) and the economics of cognitive and
noncognitive skill formation into a composite termed “human capabilities.” See, e.g., James
J. Heckman, The Economics, Technology, and Neuroscience of Human Capability Formation,
104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 13250, 13250 (2007).
7. This may be an opportune moment in legal discourse, and especially in legal scholarship as we are “at a moment when structural and political shifts have reopened essential
questions about the meaning of liberty and equality, the relationship between the state and
the economy, and the interactions between capitalism and democracy.” Jedediah BrittonPurdy et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the TwentiethCentury Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1791 (2020).
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on a populace, rather than putting the responsibility for public
welfare on individual behavior. And it avoids some of the critiques
and shortcomings of recent efforts in “behavioral public policy” while
still making use of the research and insights into human cognition
and behavior. Collective cognitive capital may also help define and
clarify harm when government and regulated entities directly interact with people and consume—often waste—collective cognitive capital. Moreover, its normative definition of what is valuable—brain
functioning that subserves and maximizes agency—is aligned with
what makes us human.
Here is the high-level sketch of “collective cognitive capital,” with
expansion in the Parts that follow.
The “cognitive” aspect of the framework broadly means “derived
from brain states.” It envisions synthesis of group-based data on
brain development and plasticity, general intelligence and fluid
reasoning, cognitive control, and cognitive reserve. Importantly,
“cognitive” also includes what are sometimes defined as “noncognitive” features and skills, such as emotional and social regulatory
abilities.
“Collective” emphasizes that while brain/behavioral data is collected from individuals, it is most meaningful at the group level. It
also captures the distinct property of the relational nature of
cognition and a lot of behavior in important contexts; the collective
resource is more than the sum of individual components.
The term “capital” conveys that the resource requires investment
to maximize productivity, is capable of growth, is subject to fluctuations in response to surrounding conditions, and is harmed by underinvestment or withdrawals (such as neglect, trauma, stress,
health, nutrition, toxins, and injury). “Capital” is an imperfect metaphor, but nevertheless a deliberate use of the dialect of the current
political economy. Making the output of law and neuroscience
interdisciplinary work actionable at a structural policy level may be
facilitated by speaking the language of capital.
Cognitive capital would be accurately understood as something
that everyone possesses, though in varying amounts, at varying
points in time. It may be grown with investment without benchmarking as to any individual’s unknowable maximum capability.
Cognitive capital can be acutely spent on valuable activities that
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promote long-term growth, wastefully spent, or chronically diminished by disinvestment. The concept is broader than the narrow set
of cognitive abilities that are already known to strongly predict formal academic success or high earnings in the knowledge economy.8
It recognizes that success in life and in many sectors of the labor
market—and in the non-compensated labor market, such as caregiving, relationship maintenance, self-care skills such as management
of personal finances, and community-directed labor-like activities
such as voting, civic engagement, and volunteering—requires a complex suite of abilities, including emotional and social capacities, as
well as attentional and inhibitory control. The framework is not
meant to be elitist or exclusionary of those with mental illness, neurological atypicality, cognitive disabilities, or below-average endowments of any of the four factors, because it should not be used to
rank or convey relative worth or a measure of any individual’s “cost”
or “benefit” to society.9 As an aggregate property, it accounts for the
inherently social and relational nature of society. Others have
defined something akin to sufficient cognitive capital as necessary
for a functioning participatory democracy.
The utility of the collective cognitive capital framework is first in
the “naming and framing” that is critical to uptake as a policy goal.
With further model development, it could be a cross-disciplinary
analytical tool like cost-benefit analysis. It could also help guide
normative decisions about legislation and administration in the
service of human flourishing. For example, the effects of climate
change may be assessed with respect to the impact on collective
cognitive capital (rather than strictly economic measures). A recent
study reported on a large international sample correlating detailed
weather data and educational outcomes, building on literature that
exposure to heat impairs short-term cognitive function.10 Within and
across countries, heat exposure (due to climatic differences and differential exposure related to socioeconomic status) on school days
8. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82, discussing the concept of “human capital.”
9. As noted above, the metaphor of “capital” is imperfect, and this is one of the imperfections. Physical and economic capital can be directly compared and valued; the framework
of collective cognitive capital incorporates normative boundaries on the concept that delimit
it from conveying relative human worth or dignity.
10. R. Jisung Park et al., Learning Is Inhibited by Heat Exposure, Both Internationally
and Within the United States, 5 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 19 (2021).

1356

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1347

is associated with decreases in learning.11 The impact of air pollution on mental health, dementia, and cognitive reserve is also
beginning to be understood.12 As a coherent descriptive and normative theory, collective cognitive capital can also generate testable
hypotheses for policy experimentation. This may be particularly
important in policy areas in which experimental research is
pragmatically limited, but data-informed ideas can generate new
theories and policy experimentation.
This Article argues that collective cognitive capital is something
that law, policy, and procedure should seek to maximize in any
given group encountering a particular legal or policy scheme. The
analysis supplied by the framework would be: Does this law or
policy, on its face or in practice, increase or decrease the collective
cognitive capital of the group(s) to whom it is applied or will most
directly affect (either acutely or over time)? Is there another way to
achieve similar ends that less negatively impacts collective cognitive
capital? These are the core questions that a framework grounded in
brain and behavioral science can help policymakers address.
When many policy metrics already exist, and sociological and
biological sciences have already done so much to characterize the
relationships between behavior and environment, how does brain information help explain why and how policies that protect cognitive
capital matter? First, and most importantly, it enables greater empirical accuracy by permitting integration of biological information
such as nutrition, toxins, and other environmental stressors. These
are important determinants for which behavioral economics, though
dominant in policy discussions focused on shaping individual decision-making, has no sufficient model. Second, it creates room for
theory and known information about brain plasticity and resilience,
which facilitates the following framing: cognitive capital is not a
fixed capacity but is substantially determined by life events and environments; policy helps determine what happens in those lives; and
outcomes with respect to cognitive capital affect how society fares
overall. Moreover, expanding a sociobehavioral model to be conceptually grounded in “the brain” provides rhetorical and heuristic
11. Id. at 19-22.
12. See infra note 43; see also Zhi Li et al., Air Pollution Interacts with Genetic Risk to
Influence Cortical Networks Implicated in Depression, 118 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 1 (2021).
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power, potentially critical for appealing to policymakers.13 Getting
policymakers to consistently view the brain as the final common
pathway for complicated and difficult-to-measure social, cultural,
and environmental factors may have the effect of focusing attention
on a model that can give an assessment of any given policy proposal
in terms of its effect on collective cognitive capital. In short, brains
should matter.
This Article explores these ideas in four parts. Part I offers the
descriptive content of the framework by sketching the contours of
“cognitive”—the areas of brain and behavioral research findings
that make up the substance of the framework—and explains why
the concept is “collective” rather than individualistic or diagnostic.
Part II provides context and further justification. First, it puts the
collective cognitive capital framework in context with other theories of human resources. Second, it contrasts collective cognitive
capital with the project of behavioral law and economics—to date,
the dominant framework for bringing behavioral science to bear on
law and policy. Third, it outlines collective cognitive capital as an
analytical process, with brief analogies to other policy analysis tools
and explanation via some hypothetical examples. Part III defends
the normative claim that collective cognitive capital is an output
that law and policy should seek to maximize. Its grounding in brain
and behavioral function subserves pursuit of other societal values
such as self-governance, social cohesion, hedonics, and well-being.
It can inform “political judgments about what should count as ‘costs’
and ‘benefits,’”14 including policies and citizen-state interactions
affecting non-compensated labor and self-care life skills, which require and benefit from increases in collective cognitive capital. Part
IV briefly addresses some of the limitations, caveats, and risks of
this theory. Any attempt at such a sweeping, interdisciplinary
theory will have plenty of them—foremost among them is the
stipulation that this idea is nascent and will require refinement in
scope, substance, and connection to other developments in law.
Closely following is the stipulation that a focus on brains is not
inherently reductive, essentialist, or medicalizing—though there
are inherent risks of being understood as such. Nevertheless, this
13. See Lucy A. Jewel, The Biology of Inequality, 95 DENV. L. REV. 609, 651, 653 (2018).
14. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 7, at 1805.
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Article attempts to sketch the outlines of a framework for delivering
the existing and forthcoming insights from brain and behavioral
research into actionable tools for policymakers by using familiar
language and concepts. It offers a significant departure from prior
work in law and neuroscience and an ambitious agenda for future
efforts.
I. THE CONTOURS OF “COGNITIVE” AND THE AGGREGATION OF
“COLLECTIVE”
This Part describes the content of “cognitive” and the scope of
“collective” in the framework of collective cognitive capital. It describes what fits within the concept and explains why its boundaries
are unavoidably somewhat fuzzy. The purpose of this Part is to
explain the rough contours of how the collective cognitive capital
framework uses research findings and theories from multiple areas
of brain and behavioral science research to operationalize abstract
but important concepts like “capabilities.”
A. Defining the Broad Scope of “Cognitive”
“Cognitive” as used here means “derived from brain states.” It
incorporates several broad domains of behavioral and brain research: brain development and plasticity, general intelligence and
fluid reasoning (the capacity to think logically independent of
background knowledge), and functions that are termed cognitive
control (including attentional control and inhibitory control), and
cognitive reserve (resilience in the face of neuropathology and
aging). “Cognitive” is used more broadly here than in the classic
scientific definition (and perhaps popular imagination) as functions
that are rational, computational, and in opposition to emotion. The
pervasive dichotomy between cognition and emotion is not particularly useful or important here, as many socially important brain
functions (such as perspective-taking and empathy) are hybrid
cognitive/emotional skills. Thus, “cognitive” as used here also includes classically “noncognitive” features and skills such as emotional and social regulatory abilities. It means something more
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broadly like “perceiving, thinking, feeling, deciding, acting, and the
means to do so.”15
By including measures of brain development, plasticity, and
resilience, “cognitive capital” goes beyond functional trait-based
concepts and incorporates biological information about brain
functions where connections to traits may be quite distant (development and reserve) and are not yet well understood (plasticity and
resilience). Yet their inclusion in the framework permits incorporation of the effects of biologically measurable stressors such as toxins,
nutrition, illness, isolation, and stress, which have effects on cognition and brain function even though the precise mechanisms
remain poorly understood. Each of these can be affected by policy.
For the framework to adequately incorporate them, data suggesting
causal relationships between environmental factors or context and
behavior (which is expression of brain function)16 and the magnitude
of such effects should be adequate; specific mechanisms are not
required, though they would undoubtedly refine the conceptual
model and make it more precise.17
15. This is distinct from the previous (but limited) use of the term “cognitive capital” in
economics, first proposed by Colin Camerer and Robin Hogarth, where cognitive capital was
more explicitly defined by a given individual’s set of “procedural knowledge” to solve certain
experimental tasks (know-how, heuristics, analytical skills, previous experience in the task)
in the context of comparing the “capital” that could be put to solve a task with the “labor” in
terms of mental effort. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial
Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 9-10 (1999); see also OndĢej Rydval, Financial Incentives and Cognitive
Abilities: Evidence from a Forecasting Task with Varying Cognitive Load, 1 JENA ECON. RSCH.
PAPERS 1 (2007), https://ideas.repec.org/p/jrp/jrpwrp/2007-040.html [https://perma.cc/P7UF9APH]; T. Parker Ballinger et al., Saving Behavior and Cognitive Abilities, 14 EXPERIMENTAL
ECON. 349, 352 (2011) (describing cognitive capital as a vector of various (possibly interacting
and time-variant) limits on cognition that may be imperfectly measured by various tests of
cognitive abilities of a given individual). A similarly individuated concept of “human capital”
is embodied in an individual’s investments in education or job training, sometimes treated as
cognitive ability and tightly related to fluid and crystallized intelligence. See, e.g., John J.
McArdle & Robert J. Willis, Cognitive Aging and Human Capital, in GROUNDING SOCIAL
SCIENCES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES 351, 356-58 (Ron Sun ed., 2012).
16. That behavior is an expression of brain function is an uncontroversial claim in brain
and behavioral sciences. The claim is simply that behavior is a product of brain activity. This
is not true for reflexes (like withdrawing a hand from a hot stove, or involuntarily kicking
when the doctor taps on your knee) and other actions that are neurally mediated in the spinal
cord. It is arguably true for bodily functions such as breathing, which are regulated in the
brain stem. But for the kinds of “behavior” that policy cares about, it is all a product of brain
activity.
17. See Till Grüne-Yanoff, Why Behavioural Policy Needs Mechanistic Evidence, 32 ECON.
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B. Defining and Justifying “Collective”
Before delving into the details of the subcomponents of “cognitive,” it is important to define “collective” and understand why it is
an inextricable component of the framework of collective cognitive
capital. “Collective” means that the assessment of cognitive capital
must take place at the level of the group, even though data measurements are taken from individuals. “Collective” refers to a
relevant group, which may change depending upon the policy issue
at hand. The framework is not static—it can accommodate different
inputs depending upon the group and situation under consideration.
If empirical data is not available for the specific affected group,
models may be put together with a convenience sample using the
best judgment about similarities of relevant group properties and
treated as hypothesis-generating and needing verification based on
close observation. Some fuzziness is perhaps unavoidable in determining group boundaries within different policy environments.
This focus on group-based assessment of collective cognitive capital is important and unavoidable for at least two reasons. First,
understanding causal relationships between policy interventions
and outcomes is possible only with aggregate data. This is familiar
from epidemiology and social sciences. Moreover, the substance of
“cognitive capital” is constructed from group data about complex,
subtle, normal, and social behaviors—not diagnostic constructs.
Robust and replicable research findings underpinning the conceptual model—particularly because of inherent “noise” in behavior
within and between individuals as well as dynamic brain states18—
are assessed at the group level, and even require reasonably large
groups for research to have sufficient power to find small effects.
The data is at its strongest in the basic research context.19 The
& PHIL. 463, 471-72 (2016).
18. DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., NOISE: A FLAW IN HUMAN JUDGMENT 84, 93 (2021).
19. Skeptics may think of the “replication crisis” in psychology, other social sciences, and
neuroscience, and be doubtful that research findings are indeed robust. This is a fair criticism.
See, e.g., Scott E. Maxwell et al., Is Psychology Suffering from a Replication Crisis? What Does
“Failure to Replicate” Really Mean?, 70 AM. PSYCH. 487 (2015); Colin F. Camerer et al.,
Evaluating the Replicability of Social Science Experiments in Nature and Science Between
2010 and 2015, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 637 (2018); Russell A. Poldrack et al., Scanning the
Horizon: Towards Transparent and Reproducible Neuroimaging Research, 18 NATURE REVS.
NEUROSCIENCE 115 (2017). But collective cognitive capital purports to be a theory and a
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behavioral and brain science research that make up the conceptual
framework are not diagnostic in nature, and thus “cognitive capital”
is not useful for individual diagnosis or adjudication.20 Finally, some
of the key properties in the framework of collective cognitive capital—such as emotional and social regulatory abilities—might be
understood as inherent qualities of groups as well as individuals.
The second reason for the necessary focus on collective is that
collective outcomes are the coin of the realm for policy metrics. Even
if indicators like “cognitive capital” could be identified at the individual level, policymakers should be more attuned to collective
outcomes.
C. Defining the Substance of the Framework
The prior two Sections have defined the broad scope of “cognitive”
and the inextricable nature of “collective.” The following Subsections will outline the major domains of brain and behavioral science
data that make up the preliminary concept of the collective cognitive
capital framework. The framework’s core components can be usefully organized as “biological” and “functional,” a taxonomy of convenience based on how they are and may be assayed and measured.
This taxonomy does not reflect essentialization of some features
over others or endorsement of a brain/mind duality. Rather, it is
meant to inclusively reflect the nature of data that could make up
the framework.

framework, subject to revision after policy experimentation. One feature of non-reproducible
results in social and hard science fields is low statistical power. This is an opportunity for
brain and behavioral scientists to get involved in policy work: large-scale policy can, if
thoughtfully designed and monitored, potentially produce useful data that can contribute to
the ongoing scientific process of uncertainty reduction. Theory is useful for policy making. See
Kathryn Zeiler, Cautions on the Use of Economics Experiments in Law, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON. 178, 186 (2010) (“By recognizing that theories rather than experiment
results are applied in policy analyses, we can engage in a more productive process of developing robust and useful theories that can be applied in policy analyses.”).
20. The “group-to-individual” or “G2i” problem plagues the courtroom focus of much of
“law and neuroscience” efforts. Collective cognitive capital entirely sidesteps the problems of
group-to-individual inference because it explicitly disclaims individual adjudication. David
L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 417, 421-22 (2014).
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1. The “Biological” Subcomponents of “Cognitive”:
Development, Plasticity, Reserve, and Resilience
Let’s first consider the elements of collective cognitive capital
representing more “biological” features, those that could conceivably
be measured with neurobiological (in addition to behavioral) assays:
development, plasticity, reserve, and resilience.
For brain development, the conceptual model would focus on
accounting for known and suspected detriments to growth and
development, including the extensive sociological, behavioral, and
neuroscientific literature on poverty and trauma, and the related
sociomedical literature on poor nutrition, environmental toxins, and
other social determinants of health environmental toxins. Malnutrition;21 sleep deprivation;22 maltreatment;23 and in utero,24 early
childhood, or other life course exposure to environmental toxins25
(such as lead) or ingested toxic substances (such as alcohol)26 are also relevant areas of research to a conceptual model for how policies
might affect brain development. Positive factors that contribute to
21. See, e.g., Bhoomika R. Kar et al., Cognitive Development in Children with Chronic
Protein Energy Malnutrition, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN FUNCTIONS 31 (2008); Paul Glewwe &
Elizabeth M. King, The Impact of Early Childhood Nutritional Status on Cognitive
Development: Does the Timing of Malnutrition Matter?, 15 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 81 (2001);
Kathleen S. Gorman, Malnutrition and Cognitive Development: Evidence from
Experimental/Quasi-Experimental Studies Among the Mild-to-Moderately Malnourished, 125
J. NUTRITION, 2239S (1995).
22. See William D.S. Killgore, Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Cognition, 185 PROGRESS
BRAIN RSCH. 105 (2010); James E. Jan et al., Long-Term Sleep Disturbances in Children: A
Cause of Neuronal Loss, 14 EUR. J. PAEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 380 (2010).
23. Genevieve Young-Southward et al., Investigating the Causal Relationship Between
Maltreatment and Cognition in Children: A Systematic Review, 107 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
1 (2020); Marijcke W. M. Veltman & Kevin D. Browne, Three Decades of Child Maltreatment
Research: Implications for the School Years, 2 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 215 (2001).
24. Justin H. G. Williams & Louise Ross, Consequences of Prenatal Toxin Exposure for
Mental Health in Children and Adolescents, 16 EUR. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 243
(2007); PETER GLUCKMAN & MARK HANSON, THE FETAL MATRIX: EVOLUTION, DEVELOPMENT
AND DISEASE 37 (2005); Joseph L. Jacobson & Sandra W. Jacobson, Intellectual Impairment
in Children Exposed to Polychlorinated Biphenyls in Utero, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 783 (1996).
25. Alison P. Sanders et al., Perinatal and Childhood Exposure to Cadmium, Manganese,
and Metal Mixtures and Effects on Cognition and Behavior: A Review of Recent Literature, 2
CURRENT ENV’T HEALTH REPS. 284 (2015); David Bellinger et al., Longitudinal Analyses of
Prenatal and Postnatal Lead Exposure and Early Cognitive Development, 316 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1037 (1987).
26. Linda B. Hassing, Light Alcohol Consumption Does Not Protect Cognitive Function:
A Longitudinal Prospective Study, 10 FRONTIERS AGING NEUROSCIENCE 81 (2018).
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brain development belong here too, including the enormous literature that has built consensus on the importance and efficacy of
quality early childhood environments.27
But brain development is not just an issue of early childhood.
Significant brain growth and pruning takes place through early
adulthood.28 Even in adult brains, new learning and new cellular
generation continues throughout the lifespan.29 Environmental insults, toxins and nutrition, sleep quality, poverty and low socioeconomic status,30 excessive stress, and mental and physical health
(including chronic pain),31 in addition to education, socialization,
and regular engagement, continue to have acute and likely chronic
effects on adult brain functional capacities.
“Cognitive reserve” describes the persistence of a particular cognitive function or skill against brain pathology and/or the ability to
use alternative functions when a default function is diminished or
destroyed. Cognitive skills, including fluid intelligence, decline with
normal aging as well as with brain pathology, but with significant
variation among individuals. Declines in executive functioning have
an outsize impact on daily life functioning, including self-care activities not generally considered in human capital assessments
focused on economic productivity or generativity. Such tasks include
remembering to take medication, doing household chores such as

27. See, e.g., Kaspar Burger, How Does Early Childhood Care and Education Affect
Cognitive Development? An International Review of the Effects of Early Interventions for
Children from Different Social Backgrounds, 25 EARLY CHILDHOOD RSCH. Q. 140 (2010);
Douglas Almond & Janet Currie, Human Capital Development Before Age Five, in 4B
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1315 (David Card & Orley Ashenfelter eds., 2011); W.
Steven Barnett, Long-Term Effects of Early Childhood Programs on Cognitive and School
Outcomes, 5 FUTURE CHILD. 25 (1995). But the policy implications are more nuanced than a
“one size fits all” model of early childhood care and education. Cf. Kelly Durkin et al., Effects
of a Statewide Pre-Kindergarten Program on Children’s Achievement and Behavior Through
Sixth Grade, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH., Jan. 10, 2022, at 1, 1-3; Michael Baker et al., The LongRun Impacts of a Universal Child Care Program, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 1 (2019).
28. Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8174 (2004).
29. Fred H. Gage, Neurogenesis in the Adult Brain, 22 J. NEUROSCIENCE 612, 612 (2002).
30. See generally Emma Boswell Dean et al., Poverty and Cognitive Function, in THE
ECONOMICS OF POVERTY TRAPS 57 (Christopher B. Barrett et al. eds., 2019). See infra text
accompanying note 58.
31. A.V. Apkarian et al., Pain and the Brain: Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain in
Clinical Chronic Pain, 152 PAIN S49 (2011); see also Pustilnik, supra note 4.
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cooking and food shopping, and effectively managing money.32
Individuals performing these types of skills and tasks for themselves, along with many types of inter-family caregiving or selfcaregiving tasks, are not considered generative or included in
economic policy metrics such as gross domestic product,33 but they
are sources of economic cost if they are not maintained. More
importantly, cognitive reserve and preservation of function is fundamental to an individual’s well-being, dignity, and autonomy, and
thus has intrinsic value. The subjective experience of cognitive
decline can be a source of great distress.34 Valuing and preserving
cognitive reserve has benefits from both an economic cost-benefit
perspective as well as welfare functions that use subjective wellbeing; collective cognitive capital is a framework that can account
for both.
Cognitive reserve is a challenging component of collective cognitive capital to operationalize, but is a key component of collective
outcomes and deserving of attention in policy decisions. The neural
mechanisms of cognitive reserve are an area of active neuroscience
research.35 Behavioral data indicates that, on average, individuals
with increased cognitive reserve tend to be more highly educated,
possess higher fluid intelligence (as measured by IQ scores), reach
higher ranks of occupational attainment, speak another language,
32. See Gad A. Marshall et al., Executive Function and Instrumental Activities of Daily
Living in Mild Cognitive Impairment and Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA
300 (2011); Julene K. Johnson et al., Executive Function, More than Global Cognition, Predicts
Functional Decline and Mortality in Elderly Women, 62 J. GERONTOLOGY: MED. SCIS. 1134
(2007); Kathleen Insel et al., Executive Function, Working Memory, and Medication Adherence
Among Older Adults, 61B J. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCH. SCIS. P102 (2006); Deborah A. CahnWeiner et al., Prediction of Functional Status from Neuropsychological Tests in CommunityDwelling Elderly Individuals, 14 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST 187 (2000); Michelle C.
Carlson et al., Association Between Executive Attention and Physical Functional Performance
in Community-Dwelling Older Women, 54B J. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCH. SCIS. S262 (1999).
33. See, e.g., Valeria Esquivel, Feminist Economics, in COMPANION TO FEMINIST STUDIES
265, 268 (Nancy A. Naples ed., 2021).
34. Rachel F. Buckley et al., Subjective Cognitive Decline from a Phenomenological Perspective: A Review of the Qualitative Literature, 48 J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE S125, S129 (2015);
David J. Vinkers et al., Temporal Relation Between Depression and Cognitive Impairment in
Old Age: Prospective Population Based Study, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 881, 881 (2004).
35. See, e.g., Yaakov Stern et al., Brain Reserve, Cognitive Reserve, Compensation, and
Maintenance: Operationalization, Validity, and Mechanisms of Cognitive Resilience, 83
NEUROBIOLOGY AGING 124 (2019); Laura Serra et al., Cognitive Reserve: The Evolution of the
Conceptual Framework, 3 J. SYS. & INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2017).
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and are involved in a diverse range of nonwork activities.36 As a
potential diagnostic tool, measures of cognitive reserve have been
successful at predicting clinical status in aging as well as a number
of neurodegenerative disorders and brain injury.37 Some risk of
certain neuropathologies can be predicted from genetic testing.38 But
the mechanisms of diminishing cognitive reserve—or preservation
of cognitive capacities in the face of normal aging—remains something of a mystery and, at present, a large market for products and
services.39 Well-validated and agreed-upon measurement techniques
are still being developed.40 Biomarkers are plausible but not yet
definitive for diagnosis.41 For example, brains can show pathology
suggestive of degenerative disease but without exhibiting behavioral
symptoms.42 While there is significant clinical interest in individualized predictions of decline, the role of cognitive reserve in the framework of collective cognitive capital is identifying causal factors
impinging on cognitive reserve that can be influenced by social policy, such as levels of education, nutrition, provision of social services, and reduction of harmful toxins or stressors.43 Policy decisions
36. See Dennis Chan et al., Lifestyle Activities in Mid-Life Contribute to Cognitive Reserve
in Late-Life, Independent of Education, Occupation, and Late-Life Activities, 70 NEUROBIOLOGY AGING 180 (2018); Mandana Fallahpour et al., Leisure-Activity Participation to Prevent
Later-Life Cognitive Decline: A Systematic Review, 23 SCANDINAVIAN J. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 162 (2016); Ellen Bialystok et al., Bilingualism, Aging, and Cognitive Control: Evidence
from the Simon Task, 19 PSYCH. & AGING 290 (2004); Laura Fratiglioni et al., An Active and
Socially Integrated Lifestyle in Late Life Might Protect Against Dementia, 3 LANCET
NEUROLOGY 343 (2004); Nikolaos Scarmeas & Yaakov Stern, Cognitive Reserve and Lifestyle,
25 J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 625 (2003).
37. See Yaakov Stern, Cognitive Reserve: Implications for Assessment and Intervention,
65 FOLIA PHONIATRICA ET LOGOPAEDICA 49 (2013); Bruce R. Reed et al., Measuring Cognitive Reserve Based on the Decomposition of Episodic Memory Variance, 133 BRAIN 2196 (2010).
38. See Carolin A. M. Koriath et al., Genetic Testing in Dementia—Utility and Clinical
Strategies, 17 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY 23 (2021).
39. See Daniel Barulli & Yaakov Stern, Efficiency, Capacity, Compensation, Maintenance,
Plasticity: Emerging Concepts in Cognitive Reserve, 17 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 502 (2013);
Jason Steffener & Yaakov Stern, Exploring the Neural Basis of Cognitive Reserve in Aging,
1822 BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA 467 (2012).
40. See Nadja Kartschmit et al., Measuring Cognitive Reserve (CR)—A Systematic Review
of Measurement Properties of CR Questionnaires for the Adult Population, 14 PLOS ONE 1
(2019).
41. Kevin J. Sullivan et al., Association of Midlife Plasma Amyloid-ǃ Levels with Cognitive
Impairment in Late Life: The ARIC Neurocognitive Study, NEUROLOGY, Sept. 2021, at 1.
42. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. For example, several recent observational studies demonstrate that improving air
quality appears to reduce risk of cognitive decline and dementia. Improving Air Quality
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could be analyzed with respect to whether their implementation
supports or impinges upon the cognitive reserve of an affected
populace.
Resilience as a component of collective cognitive capital offers
theories of optimism, based on accumulating evidence of neural
plasticity. Resilience is the quality of systems that permits processes
of recovery and adaptation in the face of challenges, adversity,
trauma, and all of the insults that can dampen brain development
and affect cognitive function. The research field is young and dynamic; several “waves” of research into resilience have already
crested.44 The present call in the field of psychological resilience
studies is to recognize and conceptualize resilience as not just an
individual-level phenomenon—including study of genetic, epigenetic, and molecular biology—but also a social systems-level phenomenon.45 Integration of research and theories across these levels is
anticipated with computational advances in the coming years.46 The
component of resilience is perhaps the least well operationalized in
the entire collective cognitive capital model, but its inclusion is
essential. Resilience is what promotes hope for better futures. In
contrast to the idea that “brain-based” means biologically “hardwired” and thus determined, work on resilience and interventions
supports theories of potential neurological recovery from traumas,
adversity, or the sequalae of low socioeconomic status.47 Though the
Reduces Dementia Risk, NEUROSCIENCE NEWS (July 26, 2021), https://neurosciencenews.com/
air-pollution-dementia-18984/ [https://perma.cc/CGU4-DL8N]; Kevin J. Sullivan et al., Ambient Fine Particulate Matter Exposure and Incident Mild Cognitive Impairment and Dementia,
69 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2185, 2189-90 (2021).
44. See ANN S. MASTEN, ORDINARY MAGIC: RESILIENCE IN DEVELOPMENT 6 (2014).
45. Christy A. Denckla et al., Psychological Resilience: An Update on Definitions, a Critical Appraisal, and Research Recommendations, 11 EUR. J. PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 1822064
(2020); see also Steven M. Southwick et al., Resilience Definitions, Theory, and Challenges: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 5 EUR. J. PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 25338 (2014).
46. Denckla et al., supra note 45, at 1822064.
47. See, e.g., Ann S. Masten, Resilience in Developing Systems: Progress and Promise as
the Fourth Wave Rises, 19 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 921, 922-23 (2007) (“Meanwhile, there
were many children growing up with high odds for suffering and failure who could not wait
for the lengthy process of basic science. This predicament motivated the third wave of work,
focused on experiments to test resilience ideas directly through prevention and intervention.”). A May 2016 conference called “Poverty, the Brain and Mental Health” brought together experts in brain science, genetics, and social work. The conference proceedings are not
publicly available, but a New York Times article provided a quote from Dr. Frances Champagne, Associate Professor of Psychology at Columbia University, summarizing the consensus
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framework of collective cognitive capital favors a conceptual and
empirical grounding in brain health, the potential of the brain to
recover, adapt, and improve in function is key to the model being
one of optimism for developing law and policy to support human
flourishing.
The research into the “biological” components just discussed is
challenging to operationalize. In the early years of building the
framework of collective cognitive capital, it may be driven by theory
more than raw data. In terms of data inputs, effect sizes, the
strength of associations, and—most challengingly—the strength of
causal relationships are the most important measures to synthesize.
One major challenge for operationalizing factors making up this
“brain biology” category is that much of the human data in this
domain are observational or at best quasi-experimental, due to
ethical constraints limiting experimentation on people and particularly on children, pregnant women, and other vulnerable groups.
This challenge is not unique to these components of collective
cognitive capital, and the implications of the weakness of causal
data will be discussed below in Part IV.
Nevertheless, a focus on “brain-based” measures may be useful
for operationalizing and standardizing inputs to the framework.
They need not involve expensive methods. For example, one study
found that a forty-five-minute assessment of three-year-old children’s “neurological soft signs, intelligence, receptive language, and
motor skills”—collectively deemed a measure of their “brain
health”—could predict with reasonable accuracy and large effect
sizes whether an individual would end up in a segment of the adult
population that accounted for a large proportion of economic burden

view from disparate fields of research:
Research in the field of epigenetics, the study of how genes and the environment
interact, has explained some of the responses that cause trouble .... Early-life
stress turns on genes that overreact to stress.... [T]hose genes that help us, to
buffer us, from the effects of stress are epigenetically silenced.... [E]vidence
showed [us] the brain’s ability to adapt meant that children and even older
people were not doomed by biology and environment.
Jim Dwyer, Studying How Poverty Keeps Hurting Young Minds, and What to Do About It,
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/nyregion/studying-how-pov
erty-keeps-hurting-young-minds-and-what-to-do-about-it.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/DT26YRP2].
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due to poor health and social outcomes.48 While the goal of measurement for collective cognitive capital is not individual prediction, the
same measure could conceivably be used to predict and then assess
the impact of a given interventional policy on group outcomes over
time.
2. The Core “Functional” Components of “Cognitive”
Next, let’s consider the components of the collective cognitive
capital framework that represent functional capacities which are
only assayable with behavioral measures. The first suite of these includes general intelligence and fluid reasoning, as well as executive
functioning, which includes attentional and inhibitory control. The
second includes what are sometimes termed “noncognitive” factors,
broadly labeled here as emotional and social behavioral regulation,
and included in the “cognitive” rubric because they arise from brain
states and are not usefully separated from what are classically
thought of as “cognitive” functions.
a. General Intelligence, Reasoning, and Executive
Functioning
What are these traits and capacities, and how do we measure
them? Measures of general intelligence and fluid reasoning, and
their state-versus-trait nature, are controversial—particularly measurements of general intelligence (assessed as IQ or g).49 But they
may be taken as a starting point for conceptual model building because they can be assessed using existing tools and compared to
existing data. Executive functioning is a general concept that has
many definitions (depending upon the researchers defining it) but
can be thought of as the set of cognitive capacities that orient
behavior towards planning, complex decision-making, sequencing
of action, and controlling impulses so as to achieve a set goal. While
the literature offers years of distributional psychometric data
48. Avshalom Caspi et al., Childhood Forecasting of a Small Segment of the Population
with Large Economic Burden, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 1, 5, 10 (2016).
49. See, e.g., Kristof Kovacs & Andrew R. A. Conway, What Is IQ? Life Beyond “General
Intelligence,” 28 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 189 (2019).
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related to general/fluid intelligence, there is less population-wide
data on other cognitive control and executive function factors. That
may change as researchers have recently demonstrated inexpensive
and effective tools to measure nonacademic capabilities that are
cognitive but knowledge domain-general, such as inhibitory control,
working memory, and implicit learning.50 There are also validated
survey-based tools to assess executive functioning in everyday life.51
Greater gaps remain between laboratory tests of risk-taking behavior and naturalistic risk taking.52
These functions are important to the framework of collective cognitive capital because they subserve human decision-making and
can also be directly affected by policy choices. At least some of these
aspects of cognitive functioning are understood to be dynamic and
sensitive to what are variously described as loads, burdens, costs, or
taxes on cognitive bandwidth.53 These taxes seem to particularly affect executive functions, especially attentional and inhibitory control, with observable effects on judgment and decision-making.54
Unlike some other factors in collective cognitive capital framework,
cognitive loads can be experimentally manipulated and thus causality can be more strongly inferred.55 Real-life cognitive burdens
can be brought to the forefront of an individual’s mind in experimental conditions, such as in a study of college students induced to
think about the high costs of college who then showed impairment
in cognitive functioning when those thoughts interacted with

50. See Amar Hamoudi & Margaret Sheridan, Unpacking the Black Box of Cognitive
Ability: A Novel Tool for Assessment in a Population Based Survey (Nov. 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). But see Stephanie M. Jones et al., Assessing Early
Childhood Social and Emotional Development: Key Conceptual and Measurement Issues, 45
J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 42 (2016).
51. See, e.g., Robert M. Roth et al., BRIEF-A: Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive
Function, PAR, https://www.parinc.com/Products/Pkey/25 [https://perma.cc/H7KB-764B].
52. Tom Schonberg et al., Mind the Gap: Bridging Economic and Naturalistic Risk-Taking
with Cognitive Neuroscience, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 11 (2011).
53. See, e.g., Dean et al., supra note 30, at 58.
54. See id. at 65; Martha J. Farah, The Neuroscience of Socioeconomic Status: Correlates,
Causes, and Consequences, 96 NEURON 56, 62 (2017); SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR
SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH 55-56 (2013); Ernst-Jan de
Bruijn & Gerrit Antonides, Poverty and Economic Decision Making: A Review of Scarcity
Theory, 92 THEORY & DECISION 5 (2021).
55. See Dean et al., supra note 30, at 59.
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identity frames or other perceived barriers to meeting goals.56 In
another example, subjects under low cognitive load proved more
capable of behaving strategically in multiplayer games.57 Evidence
is accumulating—both within individuals and across groups—that
poverty and low socioeconomic status (separate from but cumulative
to their sequalae in areas of health, sleep, and nutrition) directly
impose significant cognitive loads that impede cognitive functioning.58
b. Emotional and Social Regulation
The conceptual framework of collective cognitive capital includes
what are sometimes termed “noncognitive” components that are
critical to behavioral control, relationships and social life, work and
caregiving activities, and personal well-being.59 These are skills and
abilities such as “perseverance, motivation, time preference, risk
aversion, self-esteem, self-control, preference for leisure.”60 James
Heckman and colleagues have loosely defined these “non-cognitive
factors” as “self-control, time preference, sociability” and confirmed
that such noncognitive factors are important in explaining numerous labor market outcomes and social behaviors.61 Some might
worry that these qualities are hard to measure, and are more morally laden as attributes of character than more clinical and generalizable features of “cognition.” But all are functions of the brain,
all manifest as behavior, and all are interdependent.
The interdependence of cognitive and noncognitive abilities is
found in empirical work. Cognitive and noncognitive skills both
facilitate accumulation of the other, and “health capabilities” are
necessary to the accumulation of both.62 For example, in recent
56. Mesmin Destin & Ryan C. Svoboda, Costs on the Mind: The Influence of the Financial
Burden of College on Academic Performance and Cognitive Functioning, 59 RSCH. HIGHER
EDUC. 302, 320 (2018).
57. Sean Duffy & John Smith, Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game: Are There Brains in Games?, 51 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 47, 52, 54 (2014).
58. See Dean et al., supra note 30, at 79; see also Murphy, supra note 4, at 40.
59. See James J. Heckman et al., The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on
Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior, 24 J. LAB. ECON. 411, 477-78 (2006).
60. Heckman, supra note 6, at 13250.
61. Heckman et al., supra note 59, at 420.
62. Heckman, supra note 6, at 13254.
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behavioral economics work motivated by the desire for policymakers
to encourage sound individual financial decision-making, data
suggest that cognitive ability and “emotional stability” (as measured
by proxies IQ and EQ) both correlate with time and risk preferences.63 That is, those with higher emotional stability are “less
prone to present or future bias and are more patient” and those with
higher cognitive ability have risk preferences more like those of
expected utility theory which “may promote wiser investment decisions.”64 Whether and how “noncognitive” abilities may be affected
by policy interventions is a more open question.65 But it is indisputable that they have intrinsic value to individuals and groups.
***
The scope of data to be synthesized into the analytical model of
“collective cognitive capital” is extremely ambitious, and only roughly outlined above. Eventually, it would require extensive expertise
in statistical model building and a consortium of experts across the
various subdisciplines engaged in a project of dynamic synthesis.
Most significantly and in the first instance, it may require consensus on some type of index measures to quantify predicted effects of
a given policy choice on collective cognitive capital. Translation into
any sort of “indicator” is fraught with risk.66 It seems possible that
a sufficiently complex yet flexible model may someday be built with
emerging capabilities in data analytics and statistics, though those
techniques cannot alone substitute for human judgment about

63. Lucy F. Ackert et al., Are Time Preference and Risk Preference Associated with
Cognitive Intelligence and Emotional Intelligence?, 21 J. BEHAV. FIN. 136 (2020).
64. Id. at 147.
65. Educational efforts to improve “socio-emotional learning” are a highly relevant source
of data for this research question. See, e.g., Joseph A. Durlak et al., The Impact of Enhancing
Students’ Social and Emotional Learning: A Meta-Analysis of School-Based Universal Interventions, 82 CHILD DEV. 405 (2011); see also ALEISHA CLARKE ET AL., ADOLESCENT MENTAL
HEALTH: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SCHOOL-BASED INTERVENTIONS
(2021).
66. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis et al., Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 71 (2012).
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dependent variable inclusion. Discussion of their possibilities and
limitations is beyond the scope of this Article. The first stages of
such a project would be a multidisciplinary effort to agree upon the
descriptive components of collective cognitive capital: the important variables and best-available hypotheses about causality,
effect sizes, and convergence of experimental and observational
data. The early-stage descriptive project should be considered dynamic and generative of future hypotheses that can bring the
strengths of interdisciplinary collaboration—with a common rubric
or goal—to science and policy development focused on increasing
collective cognitive capital.
II. USING THE FRAMEWORK TO TRANSLATE THE GAINS OF BRAIN
AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE INTO POLICIES FOR
COLLECTIVE BENEFIT
A major purpose of this Article, as the introduction to the concept
of “collective cognitive capital,” is to name and frame how brain and
behavioral sciences can and should aim to affect policy at a high
level. This Part will first briefly justify the choice of a “capital”
framing, and situate collective cognitive capital relative to other
noneconomic “capital” theories and economic theories of human
capabilities. Second, it will contrast collective cognitive capital with
the currently dominant “behavioral” framework in policy making,
namely the project of behavioral law and economics. Third, it will
sketch how collective cognitive capital would be used as an analytical process, with brief analogies to other tools such as cost-benefit
analysis and welfare functions, followed by some hypothetical
examples. Part III will then unpack the normative claims that investing in and guarding collective cognitive capital should be an
overarching goal of law and policy.
A. Collective Cognitive Capital as Capital, and Related Stories
For brain and behavioral science to be synthesized into a framework that interfaces with the law and policy engines of the United
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States, it would help to speak a lingua franca.67 For the administrative state, large swaths of public law, and scholarly and political
discourse, this is often the language of capital and economic efficiency.68 Though the metaphor to economic “capital” is imperfect and
comes with ideological overtones,69 it is nevertheless useful to frame
collective brain and behavioral capacity and function as a valuable,
critical resource deserving of stewardship and attention.
Understanding “collective cognitive capital” as capital helps frame
how brain and behavioral science can interface with the status quo
of law (and policy) affecting structural aspects of social and economic life. This is because law creates, recognizes, protects, and
prioritizes capital. The law creates capital by coding resources as
capital.70 And capital, in the form of wealth and resources, directly
and indirectly dominates much mainstream legal analysis. Some
argue that several areas of private law have in the recent era “been
reoriented around versions of economic ‘efficiency’.... anchor[ing]
both the descriptive framing and the normative assessment of
law.”71 Critically, “[e]fficiency itself is typically defined—in practice
if not always in theory—as a kind of ‘wealth maximization’ that
works to structurally prioritize the interests of those with more resources.”72 In public law, citizen-state interactions are scrutinized
at the level of differential treatment of individuals and “shaped by
ways of thinking that transposed market logics onto politics and
political subjects.”73 In the current U.S. “neoliberal” state, capital is

67. Cf. Joshua W. Buckholtz et al., A Neuro-Legal Lingua Franca: Bridging Law and
Neuroscience on the Issue of Self-Control 3 (Vand. Univ. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 16-32, 2016) (writing about the need for a common language of understanding
between behavioral neuroscience and criminal law for concepts related to responsibility and
behavioral control).
68. See, e.g., Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 7, at 1812.
69. Perhaps most troublingly with the concept of “human capital” reflecting a
prioritization of economic productivity and the marketization of human labor.
70. KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND
INEQUALITY (2019). Pistor identifies the common key attributes of capital as: priority,
durability, universality, and convertibility. Pistor argues that “who has access to and control
over the legal code” has power to control capital and thus societal wealth creation and distribution. Id. at 8.
71. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 7, at 1790.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1790-91.
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well understood, valued, and a source of power.74 Brain and behavioral science can be put into the framework of collective cognitive
capital to convey to law and policy actors that the brain health and
behavioral function of the populace are understandable (that is,
comprehensible and operationalizable), valuable, a source of power,
and affected by policy choices.
The use and expansion of the concept of “capital” beyond money
or monetizable material assets is familiar in the social sciences. In
his seminal work launching the concepts of “social capital” and
“cultural capital,” Pierre Bourdieu argued that capital is a foundational concept for understanding society: “It is in fact impossible to
account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless
one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one
form recognized by economic theory.”75 Both types of capital can be
possessed by a given agent, though both are also properties of the
aggregated and relational nature of society.76
Human capital theory has its origins in economics as a theory of
investment in education and training in expectation of return in the
form of future earnings.77 Since 2018, the World Bank has calculated a Human Capital Index (HCI) as a measure of “the human
capital that a child born today can expect to attain by her 18th
birthday,” as an assessment of “her potential productivity as a future worker.”78 The World Bank HCI is calculated with three
74. I adopt the definition of “neoliberal” used by Britton-Purdy and colleagues, as “a set
of recurring claims made by policymakers, advocates, and scholars in the ongoing contest
between the imperatives of market economies and nonmarket values grounded in the requirements of democratic legitimacy.” Id. at 1789 n.21 (quoting David Singh Grewal & Jedediah
Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2-3 (2014)); see also
Jewel, supra note 13, at 645.
75. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR
THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 242 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986).
76. Id. at 241-42.
77. See Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL.
ECON. 9 (1962); see also Robert J. Willis, Wage Determinants: A Survey and Reinterpretation
of Human Capital Earnings Functions, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 525, 540, 597
(Orley C. Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986) (documenting extensive empirical support of human capital theory); GREG J. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY 106-07
(1984).
78. WORLD BANK GRP., THE HUMAN CAPITAL INDEX 2020 UPDATE: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE
TIME OF COVID-19 1 (2021). The World Bank’s definition of human capital is:
[T]he knowledge, skills, and health that people accumulate over their lives.
People’s health and education have undeniable intrinsic value, and human
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components: (1) child survival rate, (2) expected years of school
obtained by age eighteen, including school test scores, and
(3) health, including the fraction of young children not showing
stunted growth and adult survival rate.79 The World Bank’s version
of human capital, focused on “economic returns to education and
health,” treats people primarily as economic resources—units of
“productivity.”80 The United States Securities and Exchange Commission recently mandated disclosure of “a registrant’s human
capital resources, including any human capital measures or objectives that the registrant focuses on in managing the business.”81 The
concept of human capital has expanded beyond economic output
origins, and some current conceptions of it also “include knowledge,
personality traits, health, experiences, education, and cognitive
functioning.”82
In comparison to human capital, collective cognitive capital offers
an approach that is (1) more holistic and precise in terms of the
inputs and (2) less focused on conceptualizing humans as units of
economic productivity and more focused on conceptualizing cognitive
capacity and behavior as means to pursue the values of autonomy,
liberty, and dignity. Collective cognitive capital might be understood
as attempting to span both economic and personhood approaches to
a concept of property, to the extent that humans are inevitably
operationalized as some sort of property in policy making discourse.83
With respect to existing theories in development economics, the
concept of collective cognitive capital may be most closely related to
the “capability approach” to well-being.84 The capability approach is
capital also enables people to realize their potential as productive members of
society. More human capital is associated with higher earnings for people,
higher income for countries, and stronger cohesion in societies.
Id.
79. Id. at 16.
80. Id. at 5.
81. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 240 (2020).
82. Julian Christensen et al., Human Capital and Administrative Burden: The Role of
Cognitive Resources in Citizen-State Interactions, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 127, 127-28 (2020).
83. Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the FreedomPromoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1050 (2007) (“[P]roperty regimes, in some
of their central operations, confront the fact that people are at once bearers of personhood and
economic resources for one another.”).
84. Sen, supra note 6, at 30; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 12-13.
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focused on an individual’s capacity, and is “concerned with evaluating [a person’s advantage] in terms of his or her actual ability to
achieve various valuable functionings as a part of living.”85 The
capability approach is distinguished from approaches using personal
utility (for example, hedonics), absolute or relative wealth, “assessments of negative freedoms,” and Rawlsian or Dworkinian comparisons of holdings of resources as means of freedom or basis of
equality.86 Like the capability approach (and distinct from welfarist
approaches), collective cognitive capital as defined here “mak[es]
room for a variety of human acts and states as important in
themselves (not just because they may produce utility, nor just to
the extent that they yield utility).”87 It is focused on the core instrumentality of agency, which “is a broader exercise than the evaluation of well-being.”88 A newer version of the capability approach
called the “boosts paradigm” has recently been proposed as an
alternative to “behavioral public policy” as a way to “foster people’s
competence to make their own choices” and exercise agency.89
A major distinction between the capability approach (and the
“boosts” paradigm) and the framework of collective cognitive capital
is the former’s orientation towards individual versus collective
functioning. While cognitive capital of course exists at the level of
the individual, and individuals are the ones who choose and exercise
agency (though nearly always within a collective, relational
context90), theoretical analysis and predictions of outcomes are
stronger at the level of the collective. This is because, as described
above, data on brain, behavior, and causal effects is most robust in
groups, not individuals. Designing policy must focus on the collective, even if effects are manifested by individuals encountering
policy-affected structures and environments. So what does collective
85. Sen, supra note 6, at 30.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 33.
88. Id. at 37.
89. Ralph Hertwig & Till Grüne-Yanoff, Nudging and Boosting: Steering or Empowering
Good Decisions, 12 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 973, 973-74 (2017); accord Gerd Gigerenzer, The
Bias Bias in Behavioral Economics, 5 REV. BEHAV. ECON. 303, 311 (2018) (arguing that public
policies should aim “to hone the skills of the general public in dealing with risks and making
decisions”).
90. See Albert Bandura, Toward a Psychology of Human Agency, 1 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI.
164, 165-66 (2006).
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cognitive capital add to the work on the capabilities approach?
Collective cognitive capital can help operationalize concepts and put
research-based foundations (including the ability to generate new
and testable hypotheses) underneath such capability theories and
“boosting” goals. It may also help to bring a conceptual approach
that appears to be siloed in “development economics” into the mainstream for policy analysis in the United States and other “developed” economies.
B. Behavior and Brain Science in Law and Policy Can Do
Better than Behavioral Economics
The integration of behavioral science into frameworks directly
impacting policy is not a novel endeavor. But this Section argues
that present “behaviorally informed policy” is too limited in its approach.
Collective cognitive capital is a challenge to the dominance of
frameworks using “behavioral economics” or “behavioral law and
economics” (BLE) as the current method of leveraging insights from
brain and behavioral science into policy making.91 In short, this is
because the framework of collective cognitive capital does not, as the
“political project” of BLE does, limit itself to a particular policy tool
set.92 It also does not, as the empirical project of BLE has done, limit itself to a relatively narrow spectrum of psychological tools and
research questions about decision-making and rationality,93 but is
inclusive of a much broader range of human behavioral and biological studies.
91. There has been very little, if any, overlap in scholarship on “behavioral law and
economics” and “law and neuroscience.” But see Owen D. Jones, Why Behavioral Economics
Isn’t Better, and How It Could Be, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 476 (Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler eds., 2018). Collective cognitive
capital changes that by calling for a different focus and scope for the interdisciplinary efforts.
92. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1597 (2014) (discussing how “BLE often artificially and
wrongly excludes more traditional regulatory tools, such as direct mandates, from its analysis
of policy options,” in order to invest in “choice-preserving policies.” Bubb and Pildes term this
“artificial truncation.”).
93. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 91. A 2020 synthesis by Cass Sunstein states upfront that
“[b]ehavioral science emphasizes how human beings depart from perfect rationality.” CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 (Robin Boadway et al. eds., 2020).
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Whereas BLE (and its normative foundations of libertarian paternalism, discussed more in Part III) prescribes the means of
intervention and focuses on the ends of getting individuals to make
“better” choices, collective cognitive capital as a theory is agnostic
about particular policy tools as means. Moreover, it is explicit about
the ends of investing in collective cognitive capacities as a policy
goal in and of itself. It makes room for the “full implications of behavioral social science” and evaluates effectiveness of policies on
their impact on collective cognitive capital.94
What follows is a brief critique of BLE as the dominant “behavioral” paradigm in policy making. The core of this critique is that,
while currently popular, BLE is a theory for how people act, not a
theory that considers their capacities to do so. Thus, it is useful for
thinking (in some contexts) how to get (some) individuals to act in
a certain way (sometimes).95 It is less useful for considering structural questions of setting government priorities. Designing implementation methods differs from substantive policy goals, and the
normative content of libertarian paternalism’s “nudges” has come
under critique despite having only modest, incremental policy
goals.96 Part III will make the affirmative case that collective cognitive capital is a normative value to be maximized, using BLE’s
normative framework of “libertarian paternalism” as a point of
contrast.
For those who are unfamiliar, BLE explores the “legal and policy
implications of cognitive biases.”97 Thus far, it has taken a view of
how people relate to “the law” that is largely consistent with that in
neoclassical law and economics in terms of price theory98 and market fundamentalism, and it has not studied “[h]ow people relate to
94. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 92, at 1600.
95. See, e.g, Jacob Goldin, Which Way To Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the Behavioral
Age, 125 YALE L.J. 226 (2015).
96. Mark Fabian & Jessica Pykett, Be Happy: Navigating Normative Issues in Behavioral
and Well-Being Public Policy, 17 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 169, 171 (2021); see also Raj Chetty,
Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2728 (2015).
97. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2012).
98. Gregory Mitchell, Alternative Behavioral Law & Economics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 167, 182 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds.,
2014).
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the law, and what people want from the law.”99 Its normative basis
of “libertarian paternalism” promises to “regulate so as to improve
economic welfare by more closely aligning each individual’s actual
choices with his ‘true’ or unbiased preferences without reducing his
liberty, at least as it is represented by the choices available to
him.”100 It has been subject to critique from many angles, not all of
which can be done justice here. Its scholarly impacts have primarily
been felt in private law contexts (take, for example, the arguments
about the effect of the endowment effect on property law, tort law,
contract law, and intellectual property).101
In spite of the critiques, BLE and “nudging” are politically
popular. Bubb and Pildes wrote in 2014 that “[t]he United States,
the United Kingdom, and Europe appear flush with excitement for
BLE.”102 This has proven true. In 2010, the UK government
launched a Behavioural Insights Team (known colloquially as the
“nudge unit”), which is now a “social purpose company” independent
of the UK government.103 The Obama administration created the
Social and Behavioral Sciences Team in 2014 and, via executive
order in 2015, directed federal agencies to “integrate behavioral
insights into their policies and programs.”104 Notably, a UN Behavioral Science Group promotes the use of behavioral science to “progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals.”105 In 2020, BLE
giant Cass Sunstein identified “[t]he list of nations that have used
behavioral findings productively” as including: New Zealand, Australia, Germany, Qatar, Lebanon, Denmark, India, the UK, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States.106
99. Id. at 168.
100. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 97, at 1035.
101. Id. at 1043 nn.35-39.
102. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 92, at 1596.
103. Behavioural Insights Team Is Now Independent of the UK Government, GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team [https://perma.cc/
B8XM-9L2A]; The Behavioural Insights Team in the UK, CTR. FOR PUB. IMPACT (Mar. 31,
2016), https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/behavioural-insights-team-in-the-uk
[https://perma.cc/2PMN-CQE3].
104. W. J. CONGDON & M. SHANKAR, THE WHITE HOUSE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
TEAM: LESSONS LEARNED FROM YEAR ONE 77 (2015).
105. UN Behavioural Science Group, UN INNOVATION NETWORK, https://www.uninnovation.
network/behavioural-science [https://perma.cc/SE7R-T5TN]; see also UNITED NATIONS, BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE REPORT (2021).
106. SUNSTEIN, supra note 93, at 1.
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The common focus of these BLE implementation programs has
been the design of programs and policies “that depend on the
decisions or actions of individuals.”107 Broadly speaking, they have
achieved modest (but often meaningful) results in policy areas such
as: getting people to use less energy108 (but perhaps only some people some of the time depending on their political ideology109); getting
some people to pay taxes on time;110 getting people to install insulation in their attics;111 reminding people to pay their student
loans on time;112 and sending personalized reminders to complete
tasks to obtain or maintain loans for higher education and farming.113 Perhaps the biggest policy splash for “nudging” has been
changing workplace retirement savings from default opt-in to default opt-out programs,114 but without any real discussion of the
political choice to impose burdens of decision-making about retirement savings on individuals, rather than robust social security
or private defined-benefit pension plans. Moreover, some data indicates that such default shifts perversely reduced overall retirement savings because of low default contribution rates.115 What each
107. Congdon & Shankar, supra note 104, at 78.
108. Alec Brandon et al., Testing for Crowd out in Social Nudges: Evidence from a Natural
Field Experiment in the Market for Electricity, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 5293 (2019).
“Social nudges” comparing energy use to that of neighbors reduced energy use among
Southern California consumers by a combined 7 percent.
109. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Energy Conservation “Nudges” and
Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity Field
Experiment, 11 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 680 (2013).
110. DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, REMOVING THE HASSLE FACTOR ASSOCIATED
WITH LOFT INSULATION: RESULTS OF A BEHAVIOURAL TRIAL (2013).
111. Id.
112. Congdon & Shankar, supra note 104, at 83.
113. Id.
114. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1001); Shlomo Benartzi et al., Choice Architecture
and Retirement Saving Plans, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 245, 252
(Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
115. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 92, at 1618 (citing Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F.
Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J.
ECON. 1149, 1184 (2001)), 1623-24 (citing VANGUARD, HOW AMERICA SAVES (2012)). Bubb and
Pildes argue that:
Real tension exists between the social science foundations of BLE and its
political aspirations. A combination of implicit judgments about the politically
possible and a philosophical commitment to freedom of choice leads BLE to avoid
certain options, to be less self-critical of some of its recommendations as
evidence suggests it should be, and to fail to pursue fuller analysis of the range
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of these examples has in common is the focus of BLE as getting
individuals to change their behavior to make a particular program
work “better” while accepting the political economy status quo.
This focus on an individual’s decisions and thus compliance with
institutional goals as the object of BLE comes from the origins and
core postulates of behavioral economics. Herbert Simon launched
the field with the observation that mental shortcuts (“heuristics”)
were used because humans do not have the requisite cognitive capacity to process all possible relevant information and make decisions necessary to maximize their welfare.116 The response of the
project of legal libertarian paternalism—BLE—has essentially been
to develop legal and institutional rules that steer people towards
choices that promote their welfare while preserving their freedom
of choice.117 Its aim is to “create decision-making environments in
which it is easier for error-prone human decision makers to choose
well.”118 Mark White has crisply criticized this project:
Implicitly, BLE considers a person as a thing to be manipulated,
a machine that needs to be fixed, even if only for its own good. In
the case of cognitive bias, the processing mechanism (the brain)
is not working properly, so the inputs must be manipulated to
achieve the desired ends.119

of policies the underlying behavioral insights might suggest.
Id. at 1610. Overall, they argue that a more complete understanding and use of behavioral
science would go beyond “tinkering with choice architecture” in status quo programs, and
“consider the overall federal policy scheme in retirement savings as a whole.” Id. at 1633. But
see Raj Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings
Accounts: Evidence from Denmark, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1141 (2014) (finding that automatic
enrollment in retirement plans has a larger impact on retirement savings than tax incentives).
116. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON.
REV. 493, 495 (1979); see also Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69
Q.J. ECON. 99, 99-100 (1955).
117. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
175, 179 (2003); accord RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 73-75 (2008).
118. Paul Solman, Thaler Responds to Posner on Consumer Protection, PBS NEWSHOUR
(July 28, 2009), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/thaler-responds-to-posner-on-c [https:
//perma.cc/TUZ9-KUFT].
119. Mark D. White, Behavioral Law and Economics: The Assault on Consent, Will, and
Dignity, in ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS: INTEGRATION AND COMMON
RESEARCH PROJECTS 201, 205 (Christi Favor et al. eds., 2010).
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That is, in the applied program of BLE, individuals’ behavior is the
object, target, or means. Working as a tool within the existing
modern political economy, what BLE does not do (and has never
done) is enable a critique of the state or that status quo political
economy of individualism and market fundamentalism.120 But
designing implementation methods differs from establishing substantive policy goals. The normative content of libertarian paternalism’s “nudges” program has come under critique notwithstanding
its modest, incremental policy implementing goals.121
In contrast, the framework of collective cognitive capital seeks to
promote legal rules, institution design, and substantive policy goals
that further collective cognitive capacity itself—focused on the ends,
rather than exclusively on the means. The object of analysis, and
target of intervention, in collective cognitive capital is the policy,
rule, or institutional design. The question is whether that object
consumes more cognitive capital than necessary, or whether it
promotes development and preservation of cognitive capital.
This is not to say that collective cognitive capital and BLE are
mutually exclusive projects. Some of BLE’s newer projects align
nicely with a collective cognitive capital focus. Take, for example,
the seemingly organic shift in BLE policy discourse (which we will
call BLE 2.0) that has just recently begun to focus on “sludge” as the
“evil cousin” of a “healthy nudge.”122 “[S]ludge just mucks things up
and makes wise decision-making and prosocial activity more difficult.”123 Sludge cleanup campaigns are aimed at government
requirements, not individual behavior: the target of intervention is
different. But while “sludge audits” operate narrowly within the
status quo of existing systems and political economy, much as the
“nudging” projects of BLE 1.0, collective cognitive capital is a more
comprehensive framework for governance. It helps assess and value
120. See Mark Whitehead et al., Neuroliberalism: Cognition, Context, and the Geographical
Bounding of Rationality, 43 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 632 (2019).
121. Fabian & Pykett, supra note 96, at 171; see also Raj Chetty, Behavioral Economics and
Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2015).
122. See Nudge’s Evil Cousin: Sludge, INSIGHTS HUB (May 2020), https://www-2.rotman.
utoronto.ca/insightshub/behavioural-economics-marketing/nudges-evil-cousin-sludge [https://
perma.cc/B8RW-THRE]; see also Richard Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCIENCE 431 (2018);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SLUDGE: WHAT STOPS US FROM GETTING THINGS DONE AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2021).
123. Thaler, supra note 122, at 431.
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positive interventions (like public investment in education, nutrition, health and mental health care, and reduction of pollution) and
evaluate all kinds of policies that do not come with direct bureaucratic burdens for individual citizens. Collective cognitive capital
can account for the benefits of reducing “sludge”—probably the
lowest hanging fruit for implementing the overall framework—while
also offering a comprehensive normative goal with broader impact
than affecting policy implementation methods: increasing collective
cognitive capital is good.
C. Collective Cognitive Capital as an Analytic and
Framing Tool, and Some Modest Examples
This Section begins to defend the concept of collective cognitive
capital as a coherent rubric for thinking about law and policy in
many different subject areas and offers a few examples of how it
might operate. Conceptually, naming and framing collective cognitive capital can focus attention (of the public, policymakers, and,
importantly, brain and behavioral science research) on policy making focused on citizen-state interaction and regulation of private
entities. From a process point of view, it can function as an analytical framework for making choices amongst different legislative,
regulatory, and policy options. Critically, the political framing of effective policies and interventions can have an important impact on
public acceptance.
The framework of collective cognitive capital would be applied as
an analytical method to evaluate the impact of law or policy. The
questions would be: Does this law or policy, on its face or in practice,
increase or decrease the cognitive capital of the group(s) to whom it
is applied or will most directly affect? Is there another way to
achieve similar ends that less negatively impacts cognitive capital?
As described in the examples below, the framework helps guide
what are ultimately political decisions about what counts as costs
and benefits. It does not use the maximization/satisfaction of
substantive preferences—those of experts or those purportedly of
the populace—as a definition of well-being.124 Collective cognitive
124. See MATTHEW D. ADLER, MEASURING SOCIAL WELFARE: AN INTRODUCTION 7, 10-13
(2019) (defining well-being as preference satisfaction); Fabian & Pykett, supra note 96, at 170.
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capital does not rely on an unknowable end-state such as a “true
preference.”
So how does a collective cognitive capital analysis compare to
existing policy decision tools or social welfare functions? Perhaps
the most familiar to public law scholars is cost-benefit analysis,
widely discussed and deployed (albeit with uncertain consequences)
at the federal policy level since the Reagan administration.125
Whether cost-benefit analysis was the “only appropriate response
[as a] market-mediated technocracy” concerned about “interestgroup capture” in the regulatory state,126 or permits post-hoc rationalization of politically driven policy outcomes, or is merely the
prevailing fashion in policy-analysis theater, it has indisputably
been the subject of much academic critique and many calls for
alternatives.127
In response, other social welfare functions have proliferated.128
One such “well-being analysis” proposes operationalizing findings
from hedonic psychology (specifically, life satisfaction surveys and
experience sampling methods) to more directly account for how
people experience life.129 Yet assessment of private and public costs
But see Joram Nanne Pieter Feitsma, The Behavioural State: Critical Observations on
Technocracy and Psychocracy, 51 POL’Y SCIS. 387, 404-05 (2018).
125. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982),
revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638. As reaffirmed by every president since
Reagan, including Clinton (Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638), Obama (Exec. Order No.
13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012)), and Trump (Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285
(2017)). See also Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years
Later, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2011) (recounting the entrenchment of cost-benefit analysis
through subsequent administrations).
126. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 7, at 182 n.102 (noting that Cass Sunstein “defend[ed]
cost-benefit analysis ‘as a way of diminishing interest-group pressures on regulation.’”
(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 4 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 39, 1996)).
127. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism? The Positive and Normative
Flaws of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 79, 82 (2011); Robert H. Frank, Why Is CostBenefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913, 913-14 (2000); Thomas O.
McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 18 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 388 (1981); MATTHEW D.
ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 154-58 (2006).
128. Matthew Adler defines social welfare functions as having three components: a
measure of individual well-being, a rule for aggregating individuals’ well-being, and an
uncertainty module for dealing with the inevitable uncertainty about outcomes. See ADLER,
supra note 124, at 10.
129. John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J.

2022]

COLLECTIVE COGNITIVE CAPITAL

1385

and benefits, and measures of subjective well-being, are still controversial.130 Even implementation of findings from behavioral
economics about where decisionmakers deviate from rational choice
behavior ideally requires estimation of the social costs of such errors
and social benefits gained by reducing the error.131
Cognitive capital offers a measure of “well-being” that focuses on
means—brain function—not a measure of ends, such as “happiness,”
that are to be maximized.132 So can it be a social welfare function?
Perhaps with further development, but challenges are ahead.
According to Matthew Adler, social welfare functions also require a
“rule for aggregation” and an “uncertainty module.”133 For collective
cognitive capital, it may be hard to determine a clear “rule” for
aggregation, given that the boundaries of affected stakeholder
groups are dynamic and perhaps inherently fuzzy. The “uncertainty
module”—to account for uncertainty about outcomes of various
predictions—might come from refinement of the input measures,
based on observed outcomes of policy experimentation, though
further work is necessary.
Nevertheless, some governments are making moves that look a
lot like cognitive capital frameworks already. In the early 2000s, the
UK government commissioned a report from the Foresight Mental
Capital and Wellbeing Project, which was published in 2008.134 In
1603, 1621-22 (2012).
130. See, e.g., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING: MEASURING HAPPINESS,
SUFFERING, AND OTHER DIMENSIONS OF EXPERIENCE (Arthur A. Stone & Christopher Mackie
eds., 2013).
131. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 97, at 1040. Wright and Ginsburg argue that we have
moved from the “is” of empirical findings of heuristics and biases straight into the “ought” of
policy to “correct” such errors, while lacking a coherent theory of and way to account for social
costs and benefits of those interventions.
132. See WILLIAM DAVIES, THE HAPPINESS INDUSTRY: HOW THE GOVERNMENT AND BIG
BUSINESS SOLD US WELL-BEING 181-86 (2015).
133. See ADLER, supra note 124, at 140, 144.
134. GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., MENTAL CAPITAL AND WELLBEING: MAKING THE MOST OF
OURSELVES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2008). Mental capital
encompasses a person’s cognitive and emotional resources. It includes their
cognitive ability, how flexible and efficient they are at learning, and their
“emotional intelligence”, such as their social skills and resilience in the face of
stress. It therefore conditions how well an individual is able to contribute
effectively to society, and also to experience a high personal quality of life. The
idea of “capital” naturally sparks association with ideas of financial capital and
it is both challenging and natural to think of the mind in this way.
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the Netherlands, the Scientific Council for Government Policy has
“advis[ed] the Dutch government to take a realistic approach on
people’s mental capacities when designing rules and institutions.”135
The Dutch report labels the necessary capacity “self-reliance” and
“mental resilience,” but it is qualitatively and conceptually similar
to cognitive capital.136 In response to the research and synthesis of
a major report on why there are gaps between government policies,
information about them, and people’s ability to respond, the Dutch
government now subjects new policies to a “capacity to act test.”137
The test asks the key question: “Is the legislation based on realistic
assumptions about people’s mental resilience?” It poses a series of
process questions (about preliminary testing of proposed legislation,
inclusion of target groups, and consultation of research or similar
legislation) and content questions (about imposed mental burdens,
cumulative burdens, consequences of someone failing to take action
or making a mistake, and how someone can obtain help) designed
to assess the quality of proposed legislation.138

Id. at 10. Mental well-being, on the other hand, “is a dynamic state” that refers to individuals’
ability to “develop their potential, work productively and creatively, build strong and positive
relationships with others, and contribute to their community.” Id. It is not clear what has
come of this significant project in terms of policy, governance, or academic discourse; it
appears to be cited under forty times, though a related short article in Nature has been cited
more than 280 times. See John Beddington et al., The Mental Wealth of Nations, 455 NATURE
1057 (2008).
135. Anne-Greet Keizer et al., Why Knowing What to Do Is Not Enough: A Realistic
Perspective on Self-Reliance, NETH. SCI. COUNCIL FOR GOV’T POL’Y (2019), https://english.wrr.
nl/publications/reports/2019/10/14/why-knowing-what-to-do-is-not-enough [https://perma.cc/
5LN7-AKKA].
136. Id.
There is a difference between what people are expected to do and what they are
actually capable of. It is not just a small group of “vulnerable” individuals—for
example those with a low IQ—who have trouble living up to such expectations.
Even people with a good education and a favourable position in society can end
up feeling overwhelmed, certainly when they are going through a difficult patch.
That is not because they are not intelligent or knowledgeable enough, but
because demands are being made on all sorts of other mental capacities, such as
the capacity to take action, to remain calm, and to stick to their resolutions.
Id.
137. Id.
138. Anne-Greet Keizer et al., The Capacity to Act Test: Make the Public's Perspective Part
of Implementation Tests, NETH. SCI. COUNCIL FOR GOV’T POL’Y (2019), https://english.wrr.nl/
publications/reports/2019/10/14/why-knowing-what-to-do-is-not-enough [https://perma.cc/
GB8N-VLS9].
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To help make this more concrete, let’s consider a few examples of
how collective cognitive capital might function as an analytic tool or
framework for approaching some current social problems.
Example 1: Administrative Burdens and “Sludge” as Wasting
Collective Cognitive Capital
Collective cognitive capital’s initial application in the United
States may merge well with a growing attention to the state’s
imposition of cognitive load on citizens when interacting with the
government. Imposition of cognitive load is very significant for
citizen-state interactions. Such burdens/costs have been called,
variously: bureaucratic disentitlement,139 “structured rationing,”140
“administrative burdens,”141 “sludge,”142 and “time taxes.”143 What
they all are is involuntary consumption of cognitive capital by the
state and regulated entities such as healthcare (though rampant in
corporations, too). Notwithstanding the Paperwork Reduction Act,144
which applies only to the federal government and is considered to be
a failure,145 much of today’s “administrative work of the state” is
pushed onto individual citizens.146
To some degree, “admin” (as characterized by Elizabeth Emens)
is simply a part of adult life, consuming “mental energy ... drain[ing]
our mental resources not only when we focus squarely on it, but at

139. See Murphy, supra note 4.
140. See, e.g., Else Oyen, Structural Rationing of Social Service Benefits in a Welfare State,
in WELFARE OR BUREAUCRACY? PROBLEMS OF MATCHING SOCIAL SERVICE TO CLIENTS’ NEEDS
45, 53-54 (Dieter Grunow & Friedhart Hegner eds. 1980).
141. See PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN: POLICYMAKING
BY OTHER MEANS (2018).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
143. Annie Lowrey, The Time Tax: Why Is So Much American Bureaucracy Left to Average
Citizens?, THE ATLANTIC (July 27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/07/
how-government-learned-waste-your-time-tax/619568/ [https://perma.cc/59B3-7N78].
144. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21. Regulations implementing the Act are found at 5 C.F.R.
§§ 1320.1-18 (2010). Elizabeth Emens, in writing about “admin,” “wonder[s] whether, in effect,
the statute merely prompts entities to disclose how much of a burden they create—without
really leading entities to reduce admin to its ‘least burdensome’ form—given that paperwork
burden hours have continued to increase in recent years.” Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103
GEO. L.J. 1409, 1464 (2015).
145. Adam M. Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279 (2015).
146. Lowrey, supra note 143.
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other times as well.”147 But much interaction with the government
(and regulated entities, like health care systems and utilities) involves massive collective expenditure of cognitive capital that no one
would choose to do and which could be enjoyed elsewhere. Such burdens are generally inequitable, regressive, and with racialized
consequences that reproduce and perpetuate inequality.148 State
consumption of cognitive capital is worse for people with disabilities149 and people who are poor and attempting to access public
support or who lack the means to purchase cognitive capital in the
labor market—in the form of accountants, attorneys, financial
advisors, and the like.
Indeed, cognitive loading can be both a cause and direct consequence of citizen-state interactions. This is identified by some researchers as a “catch-22”: “common life factors (scarcity, health
problems, and age-related cognitive decline) both increase people’s
likelihood of needing state assistance and undermine their cognitive
resources.”150
For example, take up of the Earned Income Tax Credit (which is
only claimed by about 80 percent of eligible taxpayers each year151)
is lower among those with lower incomes (compared to those still
eligible, but with higher incomes). The data suggest that inabilities
to overcome the cognitive costs needed to learn about the program
and take advantage of it is part of the reason.152 A follow-up experiment targeting potentially eligible non-filers with information
147. Emens, supra note 144, at 1448.
148. Victor Ray et al., Racialized Burdens: Applying Racialized Organization Theory to the
Administrative State, J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY (2022) (accepted manuscript available
at https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muac001); Lowrey, supra note 143; see also Sara S. Greene,
Stealing (Identity) From the Poor, 106 MINN. L. REV. 59, 65 (2021) (identifying “plutocentric”
remedies for identity theft that disproportionately harm low-income and minority victims, and
arguing that plutocentrism also operates in occupational licensing and bail. Navigating each
of these domains consumes cognitive capital as well as time.).
149. Michael Anne Kyle & Austin B. Frakt, Patient Administrative Burden in the US
Health Care System, 56 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 755 (2021); Elizabeth F. Emens, Disability
Admin: The Invisible Costs of Being Disabled, 105 MINN. L. REV. 2329 (2021).
150. Christensen et al., supra note 82, at 128 (emphasis added).
151. Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/do-allpeople-eligible-eitc-participate [https://perma.cc/4UNY-WWEE].
152. Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete
Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3489,
3489-90 (2015).
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about their potential eligibility did not result in increased take-up
of the benefit, suggesting that mere “information costs”—only part
of “bandwidth taxes,” which also include the abilities to understand
the process, make a plan, obtain the required documentation, and
follow through—are not the significant driver of failure to take up
the benefit.153 As another example, Temporary Aid for Needy Families recipients with lower levels of education are more likely to lose
benefits for failure to meet compliance requirements.154 Cognitive
resources to keep track of such requirements and make a plan to
meet them could aid in meeting that burden—but collective cognitive capital also frames an argument that the burdens themselves
should be eliminated to consume less cognitive capital.
The collective cognitive capital framework can account for the
psychological costs and burdens of the eligibility requirements of
such programs. It can break the “catch-22” by indicating the need to
reduce the burden, facilitating access to the benefit, and thus improving the collective cognitive capital because receiving the benefits reduces immediate scarcity and improves available cognitive
bandwidth.155 This is largely consistent with the BLE 2.0 suggestion
that “Sludge Audits”156 be conducted with a particular focus on populations with lower executive functioning (such as the sick, poor,
and elderly).157 Interventions such as the EAST (easy, attractive, social, and timely) framework158 that affect the design of policy implementation may be useful precisely because they focus on reducing
cognitive burdens and increasing bandwidth, likely resulting in a
net increase in cognitive capital. In contrast, the dominant BLE 1.0
policy approach in the area of consumer credit is more or better
disclosure of the terms of consumer credit agreements.159 Collective
153. ELIZABETH LINOS ET AL., CAL. POL’Y LAB, INCREASING TAKE-UP OF THE EARNED INCOME
TAX CREDIT 23 (2020), https://www.capolicylab.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IncreasingTakeUp-of-the-Earned-Income-Tax-Credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/98A4-H98C].
154. Evelyn Z. Brodkin & Malay Majmundar, Administrative Exclusion: Organizations and
the Hidden Costs of Welfare Claiming, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 827, 832 (2010).
155. For a review of the literature on scarcity and cognitive function, see Murphy, supra
note 4.
156. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L.J. 1843 (2019).
157. Christensen et al., supra note 82, at 133.
158. DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE UNIT: HOW SMALL CHANGES CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 60-61 (2015).
159. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 92, at 1644.
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cognitive capital might predict that this intervention would not be
effective (and it is not),160 because providing ever more information
about financial products assumes that the recipient has enough
cognitive bandwidth available to process that information.161 Collective cognitive capital is a more comprehensive, and more accurate,
way than BLE 1.0 to evaluate the impact of policy changes on people
affected by those policies.
Example 2: “Welfare” Reframed as Investment in Collective
Cognitive Capital
Related to the process of removing administrative burdens are
underlying substantive policies of a social safety net. Consider a
state or municipality contemplating a universal basic income or
negative income tax as a measure to combat poverty. Standard
economic cost-benefit analysis might consider costs to taxpayerfunded budgets and potential externalized costs to society of individuals choosing not to work in low-wage, tedious jobs, with resulting impacts on wages and prices in the service sector economy.
Economic benefits might be calculated as costs saved in provision of
in-kind social services, reduced need for emergency healthcare, and
greater consumption behavior in the local economy. A well-being
analysis would assess those benefits into terms of hedonics without
the crude conversion of incommensurable subjective experience of
lived lives with the extra funds to dollar values.162 But a cognitive
capital analysis would be even more holistic. It could account for the
cognitive bandwidth freed up for recipients of the money and the
consequent activities of self-determination that would follow,
including better and increased caregiving, investment in social
relationships, and pursuit of education and training and meaningful, well-compensated work. Indeed, these outcomes are what is
described both quantitatively and qualitatively in preliminary
160. Enrique Seira et al., Are Information Disclosures Effective? Evidence from the Credit
Card Market, 9 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 277 (2017) (reporting a randomized controlled trial
finding no or only very modest effects of Truth In Lending Act-type disclosures to indebted
consumers).
161. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Rethinking Nudge: An InformationCosts Theory of Default Rules, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 531 (2021).
162. Bronsteen et al., supra note 129.
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reporting from a universal basic income experiment in Stockton,
California, that gave an unconditional $500 per month to a subset
of residents.163 It is well documented that people do better across
multiple domains when they have more resources and fewer cognitive burdens.164 The costs to collective cognitive capital would be assessed by considering how alternate deployment of the public funds
would impact the collective cognitive capital of the counterfactual
group to whom expected benefits would accrue.
Example 3: Access to Fundamental Rights Without Paying a
Price in Collective Cognitive Capital
Consider as another example a law seeking to restrict voting
access by creating additional requirements to prove identity and
eligibility to vote. Such burdens are well documented to have a disparate impact on marginalized communities such as racial minorities, the poor, and persons with disabilities.165 Yet the political
rhetoric in states enacting such laws is that their costs are trivial—
that the restrictions are necessary for election integrity and that
people who really want to, and really are eligible, can figure out
when, where, and how to vote, as well as how to obtain the requisite
documentation. If those justifications are taken seriously, inherent
in them are assumptions that information about a policy is all that
need be provided to a citizenry in order to achieve their goals, such
as casting a ballot.166 But such an analysis of the costs completely
163. STACIA WEST ET AL., STOCKTON ECON. EMPOWERMENT DEMONSTRATION, PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS: SEED’S FIRST YEAR (2020), https://www.stocktondemonstration.org/#summary-ofkey-findings [https://perma.cc/4QFR-WJKA].
164. Mesmin Destin & Ryan C. Svoboda, Costs on the Mind: The Influence of the Financial
Burden of College on Academic Performance and Cognitive Functioning, 59 RSCH. HIGHER
EDUC. 302 (2018); see Eyal Carmel & David Leiser, From Perceived Control to Self-Control,
the Importance of Cognitive and Emotional Resources, 40 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. 22, 22 (2017);
Jirs Meuris & Carrie Leana, The Price of Financial Precarity: Organizational Costs of
Employees’ Financial Concerns, 29 ORG. SCI. 1, 3 (2017).
165. See, e.g., Rabia Belt, Contemporary Voting Rights Controversies Through the Lens of
Disability, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1493-94 (2016); Rachael V. Cobb et al., Can Voter ID Laws
Be Administered in a Race-Neutral Manner? Evidence from the City of Boston in 2008, 7 Q.J.
POL. SCI. 1, 3 (2012). But see Mark Hoekstra & Vijetha Koppa, Strict Voter Identification
Laws, Turnout, and Election Outcomes 3-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
26206, 2019).
166. Keizer et al., supra note 135.
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ignores the cognitive burdens such restrictions impose on marginalized voter groups. When polls are more restricted in opening times,
people must expend more cognitive bandwidth to figure out when
they would be able to vote—if their schedule permits it at all. When
mail-in voting requires special justification and application by a
given deadline, this imposes cognitive taxes on already marginalized
voters who must incur learning costs, administrative costs, and
bandwidth costs in order to successfully learn about, anticipate, and
execute the necessary forms and correspondence. These actions
spend cognitive capital, and serve only to diminish the collective
cognitive capital of marginalized voting groups. Governments
should have a really good justification for compelling the populace
to spend cognitive capital, especially when people must do so to
exercise fundamental rights.
Example 4: Environmental Insults Can Directly and Indirectly
Damage Collective Cognitive Capital
Consider a situation of lead-tainted water in a municipality. The
costs of that policy and infrastructure failure can and should be
measured in terms of the costs to the collective cognitive capital of
the persons—especially children—who are vulnerable to irreversible
brain damage from lead.167 The collective cognitive capital framework does not require conversion of these harms into economic
terms to be valued, though it is now widely recognized that removal
of environmental lead has had salutary effects on society, measured
primarily in terms of economic indicators.168 Moreover, a remedial
measure of providing bottled water has costs to the cognitive capital
of affected groups, too, in the form of additional “life admin”169 of the
additional mental chores of tracking water needs and reserves,
coordinating water pickups, disposing of bottles, and separating
water for drinking from other uses. This is not to say that the
collective cognitive capital costs of providing bottled water outweigh
those of the effects of lead on brain and cognitive development, but
167. See Sanders et al., supra note 25, at 285.
168. Peter L. Tsai & Thomas H. Hatfield, Global Benefits From the Phaseout of Leaded
Fuel, 74 J. ENV’T HEALTH 8 (2011).
169. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 144, at 1448.
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instead to demonstrate that the costs of providing an alternative
bottled water source while water infrastructure is repaired are not
simply those of the water itself or the logistics of distribution.
Collective cognitive capital costs are also incurred by families needing to monitor and obtain water when the taps are not safe; these
are unaccounted for in a typical cost-benefit analysis.
As mentioned above, environmental insults such as air pollution
and climate change are being shown to have direct effects on brain
function and mental health.170 They are also areas of law and policy
in which behavioral economics and BLE offer nibbles around the
edges (such as research into changing consumer behavior about
energy use and decisions to purchase goods with less environmental
impact), but has nothing to say about structural policies like developing alternative energy sources. It is unreasonable to expect an
individual agent to make “better” decisions, otherwise hindered by
their cognitive biases of misfearing, miscalculation of risk, or shortsightedness, to choose to avoid ambient air pollution.171 First, they
may not have good information that it is happening or affecting
them because of policy decisions beyond their individual control.172
But also, they may not have a real choice to move to a different location. And even if one individual does, the collective population in
an affected area simply does not. This illustrates how the focus of
BLE on shaping the decisions of individuals limits its scope in policy
analysis.
As with the example of lead, these harms need not be fully
translated into economic terms to assess the effects of policies designed to reduce pollution or greenhouse gas emissions. Also in the
ledger of collective cognitive capital may be the cognitive burdens
imposed on people in businesses who must implement regulations
restructuring operations. Air pollution and climate change may
have meaningful but less dramatic effects than lead exposure, and
170. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Elke U. Weber, Doing the Right Thing Willingly: Using the Insights of
Behavioral Decision Research for Better Environmental Decisions, in THE BEHAVIORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 380, 382-84 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
172. Rachel Leven, Most of the EPA’s Pollution Estimates Are Unreliable. So Why Is
Everyone Still Using Them?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 29, 2018), https://publicintegrity.
org/environment/most-of-the-epas-pollution-estimates-are-unreliable-so-why-is-everyone-stillusing-them/ [https://perma.cc/E3DH-VE7G].
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certainly the strength of the causal relationship is more complicated
to figure out.173 And, indeed, economists make efforts at placing
dollar values on things like the IQ-lead blood level relationship and
the economic impact of regulations phasing out leaded gasoline.174
Converting brain health and functioning to dollar values—especially
in an increasingly knowledge-based economy—is extremely challenging as well as demoralizing. The framework of collective
cognitive capital provides an alternative and deeply humane way of
understanding the toll of environmental insults on the human
experience.
***
None of these examples are meant to argue that brain and
behavioral science imply that a completely stress-free environment
optimizes cognitive capital, and that law and policy should strive
towards a sanguine, stressless utopia where all life needs are
provided for. Indeed, some research into resilience comes from the
perspective that adversity can enhance some components of
learning, memory, problem-solving, and decision-making strategies
in a way that is adaptive in unpredictable environments.175 Moreover, significant evidence has accumulated supporting the notion
that meaningful work—which will involve some degree of stress—
and goal achievement are key components of life satisfaction and
overall well-being.176
But larger structural policy choices mean that, collectively,
Americans spend a lot of cognitive capital on things like choosing a
health insurance plan or planning their retirement savings. These
are difficult, complex decisions, and the BLE literature has had a
fair amount to say about how such choice environments can be
architected to help people make “better” choices. But BLE does not
173. Aaron Reuben et al., Association of Childhood Blood Lead Levels with Cognitive Function and Socioeconomic Status at Age 38 Years and with IQ Change and Socioeconomic Mobility Between Childhood and Adulthood, 317 JAMA 1244, 1244-51 (2017).
174. Tsai & Hatfield, supra note 168, at 9.
175. See, e.g., Bruce J. Ellis et al., Beyond Risk and Protective Factors: An AdaptationBased Approach to Resilience, 12 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 561, 576-77 (2017).
176. Blake A. Allan et al., Outcomes of Meaningful Work: A Meta-Analysis, 56 J. MGMT.
STUD. 500, 514 (2019).
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provide a framework to question why those choices have to be made
in the first place, and whether the public generally would be better
off with certain necessities treated as public goods.177 These are
structural, political choices that collective cognitive capital offers a
new framework to evaluate: How should we account for the
expenditure of collective cognitive capital on deciding the “right”
health plan? Collective cognitive capital gives us a way to question
whether systems are truly working to support human flourishing.
BLE generally accepts systems as they are and figures out ways to
make individuals bear their burdens slightly more efficiently.
Collective cognitive capital as a governing ethos seeks not to
make decisions for individuals, but to make decisions on behalf of
the collective—as is the role of the government—in service of
creating environments where cognitive capital grows and thus
people are as capable as possible of exercising choice and individual
autonomy. It is to the normative justification for this project that we
turn next.
III. COLLECTIVE COGNITIVE CAPITAL SHOULD BE MAXIMIZED BY
LAW AND POLICY
Having established what collective cognitive capital is as a descriptive project, we can turn now to the normative justification for
developing and applying the framework to law and policy.
Here is the strongest normative claim in this Article: collective
cognitive capital represents the sum of human capabilities and capacities that are foundational for self-determination and cooperative
governance. They are an inherent good with incommensurable
values. Put simply: it is good for human flourishing when our collective brains work well and together. So, we should try to do things

177. See, e.g., Peter Sterling & Michael L. Platt, Why Deaths of Despair Are Increasing in
the US and Not Other Industrial Nations—Insights From Neuroscience and Anthropology,
JAMA PSYCHIATRY (2022), https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2021.4209 [https://perma.cc/
WM4K-SU7R] (arguing that the increase in mid-life mortality for U.S. adults, documented
by the National Academy of Sciences report, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MEDICINE, HIGH
AND RISING MORTALITY RATES AMONG WORKING-AGE ADULTS (Kathleen Mullan Harris et al.
eds., 2021), might be improved to levels seen among sixteen other wealthy nations by
providing public support across the life cycle for “basic human needs”).
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that make collective brains work better, for longer, in the face of
unavoidable challenges.
Collective cognitive capital is something that a democratic state
should seek to maximize in its people when considering law and
policy choices.178 That is, collective cognitive capital both defines
objects of value (cognitive capital) and creates a framework to determine how value is created or harmed by policies that affect
objects of value, permitting judgments and choices about how to
maximize collective cognitive capital.179 What truly promotes autonomy, freedom, and human flourishing may require more egalitarian social investments.
As introduced in Part II, collective cognitive capital offers a
different process but also a different substantive normative theory
than the libertarian paternalism of BLE or “behavioral public policy.”180 The differences exist both in the target of the analysis and
the values to be maximized. As to the target of the analysis, collective cognitive capital is collectivist and focused on the effects of
context and institutional/societal structure on capacities, rather
than situating directional changes to individual behavior at the
center of responsibility for public welfare. The substantive values to
be maximized are also distinct. Whereas libertarian paternalism
and “nudge theory”181 applies to policymakers seeking to influence
individual behavior towards particular (paternalistic) ends, collective cognitive capital applies to evaluating and ultimately making
political judgments about the quality of different options in law and
policy because of anticipated impact on the collective cognitive
capital of stakeholder groups.
That is, collective cognitive capital does not seek to “nudge”
individuals towards particular “positive” or “beneficial” outcomes
prioritized by the status quo of the capitalist political economy—
such as default contributions to retirement savings invested in
178. This is not to claim that it is the only value. Physical health matters, as does the
human dignity of every individual regardless of their own degree of cognitive capital. Money
matters, not least because it can translate to collective cognitive capital. Legal and moral
rights and other social values matter too. Future work can determine the rankings and tradeoffs between these perhaps incommensurable goods.
179. Sen, supra note 6, at 32.
180. Fabian & Pykett, supra note 96, at 6-7.
181. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 117.
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market products (in the absence of policies providing truly robust
social safety nets for elders) or guiding a “better” choice of complex
health care plans (in the absence of a single-payer system). It does
not rely on the difficult and problematic assessments of subjective
preferences, whether “rational” or “hidden but true” because of presumed behavioral biases. Moreover, adoption of collective cognitive
capital as a governing ethos would not remove “important decisions”
from people.182 It would minimize the decisions and cognitive burdens that no one wants to make, but that they cannot avoid, such as
filing and paying taxes, dealing with the administrative burdens of
interacting with government agencies, understanding why and how
one is being billed for necessary healthcare, and jumping through all
kinds of hoops to exercise the right to vote. It also impacts policy
priorities that cannot be substantially impacted by individual decisions of the demos updating information about the consequences
of their individual actions, such as environmental degradation, toxic
pollution, and climate warming—even though these things affect
the collective cognitive capital of the people.
Instead, the substantive normative goal of maximizing collective
cognitive capital is a way to maximize the citizenry’s ability to learn,
incorporate information, and decide for itself how to establish and
best meet life goals. These are valuable attributes in themselves,
but also perhaps necessary for ideals of democratic self-governance.
Enhancing collective cognitive capital facilitates a citizenry’s conscious recognition of the reasons for its behavior, avoiding critiques
that “nudges” can reinforce heuristics and ultimately undermine the
“democratic ideal of acting in accordance with and in conscious
recognition of reasons.”183 A related critique of nudges is that they
work “epistemic injustice” by bypassing deliberative cognition.184
182. Some critics of the “paternalism” of BLE’s libertarian paternalism cite some (thin)
evidence of those raised in a “paternalistic state, and hence relieved of the need to make many
important decisions for themselves, to have less well-developed decisionmaking skills and to
be more risk averse.” Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 97, at 1073-75 (discussing a smattering
of evidence from characteristics associated with entrepreneurship and contrasting it to
narratives from communist countries, as well as the conclusion from a study that those
countries have “low levels of entrepreneurial human capital that have been engendered by
decades of existence under a central planning system that tended to blunt individual
incentives”).
183. Fabian & Pykett, supra note 96, at 172 (emphasis omitted).
184. See Evan Riley, The Beneficent Nudge Program and Epistemic Injustice, 20 ETHICAL
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The consequence of enhancing collective cognitive capital is to favor
the means of engagement and deliberation essential to the project
of democratic governance, a society with pluralistic ideals,185 and
self-determination.
The necessity of collective cognitive capital to ideals of governance links to the emerging concept of cognitive liberty.186 Nita
Farahany argues that cognitive liberty is “[t]he right to selfdetermination over our brains and mental experiences ....[and] is so
fundamental to all other freedoms we enjoy that we ought to
incorporate strong legal norms that preserve rather than undermine
it.”187 She defines cognitive liberty as an individual interest, rather
than a group property, which then “must be balanced against the
societal costs it introduces.”188 But these costs seem to be far outweighed by the benefits that argue for a normative stance of
maximization of collective cognitive liberty: “Cognitive liberty secures authority to individuals over actions essential to their selfdetermination. Self-determination requires the autonomy to control
one’s own destiny, the competence to do so, and relatedness or
connection to others.”189 Note that the “relatedness or connection to
others” can be understood as part of the “collective” part of collective
cognitive capital. Competence and relatedness are necessary but not
completely sufficient means to the ends of self-determination.
The framework of collective cognitive capital also brings brain
and behavioral science into the discourse of political power. While
a full political theory treatment is beyond the scope of this brief introduction, as a placeholder we can recognize that when people are
treated in ways that enhance their collective cognitive capital—safe
and stable environments, good education—political power tends to
flow to them. The absence of these things keeps people without
political power; without meeting basic needs first, it is not possible

THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 597 (2017).
185. See generally Nathan Berg & Yuki Watanabe, Conservation of Behavioral Diversity:
On Nudging, Paternalism-Induced Monoculture, and the Social Value of Heterogeneous Beliefs
and Behavior, 19 MIND & SOC’Y 103 (2020).
186. Nita A. Farahany, The Costs of Changing Our Minds, 69 EMORY L.J. 75, 98 (2019).
187. Id. at 98-99.
188. Id. at 98.
189. Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
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to participate in the polity.190 (On the flip side, hiring attorneys or
consultants or other professional service providers is essentially a
way of buying cognitive capital, and thus political power.)
Collective cognitive capital aligns with an orientation of law and
policy analysis towards structural concerns (given its collective
nature) and can be thought of as a fundamental element of meeting
an ideal of equality “animated by a commitment to self-rule and
sensitive to the importance of social subordination along intersectional lines.”191 Collective cognitive capital can analyze (and
perhaps model) how social subordination affects the cognitive
capital of the subordinated group, namely how cognitive burdens
perceived as reasonable by powerful decision makers are actually
experienced by subordinated groups. They may then be understood
and framed as undermining their ability to gain power and true
equality. In this way, the collective cognitive capital may provide a
method of making concrete what are perceived as dignitary—and
non-compensable—harms.
Collective cognitive capital uses the language of capital (and thus
markets) but does not evoke exactly the same ideal of neutrality
and assumptions about prices revealing preferences. As described
above, it is more neutral than the libertarian paternalism theory
founded on behavioral economics that still prioritizes rationality
and use of (purported) preferences for outcomes analysis.192 Unlike
the primacy of the market and the “market’s neutrality with respect
to any particular version to the social good,” collective cognitive
capital provides a different assessment of a social good that should
be maximized: that of cognitive capital.193 Yet it is not a social good
that requires coercion or any assessment of “true” or even revealed
190. See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1-3
(1991).
191. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 7, at 1824.
192. See Nathan Berg & Gerd Gigerenzer, As-If Behavioral Economics: Neoclassical
Economics in Disguise?, 18 HIST. ECON. IDEAS 133 (2010).
193. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 7, at 1813-14. (“The affirmative idea that a market
order secures an important form of the liberal value of neutrality interacts here with the
negative idea that any political judgments about which social interests to secure or advance
are likely to involve capture, entrenchment, and spurious claims to a (probably non-existent)
‘public interest,’ giving examples of what we earlier called market-fundamentalist and
market-tragedy arguments.... [T]his version of neutrality conceals and enforces significant
judgments about who gets what (distribution) and who gets to do what to whom (coercion).”).
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preferences; instead it seeks to maximize a tool that itself enables
the liberal values of self-determination and autonomy.194 Again,
egalitarian distributive choices may be the substantive policy means
that maximize collective cognitive capital. But from enhanced collective cognitive capital flows surpluses that can apply to the difficult political tasks of self-governance, including choices about
distributive justice.195
Collective cognitive capital thus speaks in the existing policy
discourse of neoliberal capitalism, but does so as a means towards
shifting the values away from the purported neutrality of the
market (or the challenges of assessing “true” preferences) towards
the purported neutrality of the means of human flourishing—the
capacity to think, feel, socially engage, pursue goals and pleasures,
and determine the course of one’s life. If it is regarded as a form of
welfarism, it is a version that prioritizes rather than degrades
autonomy.196
To some extent, cognitive capital already exists as an unstated
concept in law.197 The law recognizes that certain categories of persons who could be characterized as lacking sufficient cognitive
capital are accorded less legal autonomy198 and held to lower standards of accountability199 (though marginal cases or conflicts about
these decisions are necessarily adjudicated on an individualized
basis). Public investment in cognitive capital already exists in the
form of compulsory education. But as an aggregate property, it is
194. For the idea that “cognitive liberty” is necessary to self-determination, see Farahany,
supra note 186, at 99.
195. At the risk of stating the obvious, while collective cognitive capital is a “big theory” it
is not meant as a universal principle to the exclusion of other theories, particularly about
distributive justice.
196. See, e.g., Gigerenzer, supra note 89; Fabian & Pykett, supra note 96, at 177-78.
197. See Farahany, supra note 186, at 98-101 (arguing that cognitive liberty as an unstated
value in law helps make sense of disparate common law doctrines).
198. Here I refer to the concepts of legal competency and incapacity that cut across family
law, contract law, conservatorships, guardianships, et cetera, in situation-specific ways. See,
e.g., Charles P. Sabatino & Suzanna L. Basinger, Competency: Reforming Our Legal Fictions,
6 J. MENTAL HEALTH & AGING 119, 119-20 (2000) (suggesting that medical, social, and practical variables must be weighed in guardianship cases); Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing
Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 346-47, 352 n.22 (1996) (discussing how competence in the medical context is “designed to promote patients’ autonomous decisionmaking”).
199. The doctrines of infancy, incapacity, and insanity are the primary examples here. See
Sabatino & Basinger, supra note 198, at 119.
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something that law, policy, and procedure should explicitly seek to
maximize, regardless of the a priori level of cognitive capital found
in any given group encountering a particular legal or policy scheme.
Of perhaps greatest interest to neuro- and behavioral science
research communities, collective cognitive capital answers the call
for an interdisciplinary attempt to establish workable normative
principles to apply behavioral science to public policy and facilitate
“a smoother translation of psychological science from research
communities to government.”200 It should also create research opportunities and priorities. Collective cognitive capital as a theory
generates hypotheses about factors or elements of policy (and policy
implementation) that decrease or increase cognitive capital.201 While
there are many candidates for circumstances or factors that decrease cognitive capital that the law already affirmatively prohibits
(for example, neglect or maltreatment), there are many that may be
beyond the reach of a law of negative rights to enforce, though could
potentially be addressed with social programs, educational policy,
or enhanced welfare entitlements.
Further work on the legal and normative implications of cognitive
capital should be directed at a number of questions concerning the
relationship of the state to the collective: Does the laissez-faire,
capitalist state have an obligation not to enact laws or regulations
that spend, deplete, or diminish cognitive capital? Does the state’s
failure to remediate structural elements that diminish cognitive
capital for a given group (such as the poor) give grounds for an equal
protection claim? Do due process and procedural justice support and
enhance cognitive capital in theory, or is accessibility to justice so
challenging in practice that it diminishes the cognitive capital of the
200. Fabian & Pykett, supra note 96.
201. For example, I hypothesize that shame has a strong negative influence on cognitive
capital. See, e.g., Crystal C. Hall et al., Self-Affirmation Among the Poor: Cognitive and
Behavioral Implications, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 619, 619-20 (2014) (reporting findings that, among
low-income individuals at a soup kitchen, individuals who underwent an oral self-affirmation
procedure exhibited better executive control, higher fluid intelligence, and a greater motivation and willingness to enroll in benefits programs than non-affirmed participants). If
this is true, then laws and policies that create or perpetuate shame should be modified so as
not to inflict the harm on cognitive capital. Law’s attempts to eliminate social interactions or
institutional factors that systematically create and perpetuate shame—such as antidiscrimination laws—should be enacted, robustly enforced, and perpetually evaluated for their effectiveness in shame reduction and cognitive capital promotion.
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unrepresented or underrepresented (who cannot afford to buy the
cognitive capital of highly trained counsel)?
This Part has asserted that collective cognitive capital is an
inherent good that should be maximized by law and policy. It argued that we should leverage the best available understanding of
human behavior in the service of building government and institutional structures that maximize human flourishing and thus freedom. Collective cognitive capital calls for behavioral and brain
sciences to move from a basic research program to an applied one,
assessing behavioral capacities and brain health in response to
hypothesis-driven policy interventions.
IV. LIMITATIONS, CAVEATS, AND RISKS
This Article introduces the concept of collective cognitive capital
as a descriptive metric and normative theory of policy making. This
idea, and the call that it be the future of law and neuroscience
(bringing the subfield in closer alignment with the applied project
of behavioral economics and law202 ), is a rough sketch and is thus
full of potential limitations, caveats, and risks. This Part will lay
out some of the most obvious; other critiques are invited in order to
refine and operationalize collective cognitive capital. Let us take
each of these broad categories in turn: (1) limitations of the descriptive project, (2) caveats about its scope, and (3) outstanding
risks.
A. Limitations
Perhaps the biggest limitation to building the concept of collective
cognitive capital is the complexity and robustness of the data
required to flesh out each of its components. The first is in defining
and measuring what will count as collective cognitive capital. They
are multidisciplinary areas of study that range from genetics to
cellular and molecular level work on the psychopharmacology of
inhibitory control to the wide range of empirical methods in the
social sciences. And “legitimate” methodological approaches are

202. See Grüne-Yanoff, supra note 17, at 467-69.
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rightfully under scrutiny in the behavioral sciences, as they have
prioritized certain ways of knowing and defined dominant groups as
normative.203 Psychology and social science research (and the application of those fields to law and policy) is, at present, contemplating the consequences and challenges of the “replication crisis.”204
Moreover, there are major gaps in how data is collected, with documented over-representation of WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) subjects in behavioral science.205
This is also the reason this Article says nothing about race or how
policy assessment under the rubric of collective cognitive capital
would intersect with disparate impact analysis: we presently lack
race-conscious brain and behavioral science.206 Even when focused
on the United States, specific identity groups of interest in creating
just law and policy—such as racial and ethnic minorities and other
protected classes—are generally not parameters for collection of
social and behavioral neuroscience data.207
However, these limitations about the scope of data are research
opportunities if law and policy aims towards the analytical framework of collective cognitive capital. Changing methods in behavioral
science, including preregistration of methods and open data sets,
augur a future of greater confidence in research findings. But it is
also true that when such research takes place in a greater sociopolitical context, and that context changes, perfect replication

203. See Neil A. Lewis, Jr., What Counts as Good Science? How the Battle for Methodological Legitimacy Affects Public Psychology, 76 AM. PSYCH. 1323 (2021).
204. See Colin F. Camerer et al., Evaluating the Replicability of Social Science Experiments
in Nature and Science Between 2010 and 2015, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 637, 637-39 (2018)
(replicating “13 out of 21 findings from experimental social and behavioural science studies
published in Science or Nature between 2010 and 2015 based on the statistical significance
criterion”); see also Krin Irvine et al., Law and Psychology Grows Up, Goes Online, and
Replicates, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 321-23, 345-48 (2018).
205. Mostafa Salari Rad et al., Toward a Psychology of Homo Sapiens: Making Psychological Science More Representative of the Human Population, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
11401, 11402 (2018).
206. Oliver Rollins, Towards an Antiracist (Neuro)Science, 5 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 540
(2021) (“This science is ill-equipped to capture the effects of race; thus, researchers risk reproducing scientific racism through the omission of racial experiences that do not fit or are
too tricky to understand, in neurobiological calculations.”).
207. Lewis, supra note 203; see also Jessica D. Remedios, Psychology Must Grapple with
Whiteness, NATURE REVS. PSYCH. 1-2 (2022).
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should not be expected as the external conditions are not precisely
the same.208
The second area in which both data and theoretical understanding needs to be more robust is in identifying causal relationships
between collective cognitive capital outcomes and policy choices.
Randomized controlled trials, often heralded as the gold standard
of evidence in making causal inferences, are simply not always
possible. Behavioral and social sciences must often rely on correlation analysis and careful observation, which can lead to weaknesses
in determining effectiveness of interventions, particularly at the
macro or systems level and when investigating hard-to-define dependent variables such as subjective well-being.209 Calls for psychology and behavioral science to become more comfortable with
nonexperimental methods for establishing causation have a significant place in building the data sets that would make up the
collective cognitive capital model.210 Other ways of assessing the
breadth and complexity of the human experience must also be
considered.211
B. Caveats
Collective cognitive capital may seem to fetishize brain function
over other factors of health. Indeed, the model as described above
does not directly account for physical health, except insofar as poor
physical health impedes cognitive functioning and taxes cognitive
bandwidth via subjective experience of illness or chronic pain, the
“life admin” of managing a medical condition, and the inherent
psychosocial stress of ill health. But both can be valued, and both
can be factored into policy decisions. Brain function and behavior
does not need to be a final, exclusive measurement. While collective
cognitive capital is itself a valuable resource, it is not the only value;
inherent human dignity and length of lifespan can be separate,
noncompeting values to be maximized by public policy choices.

208. See Irvine et al., supra note 204, at 320-23, 345-48.
209. See Fabian & Pykett, supra note 96.
210. See, e.g., Michael P. Grosz et al., The Taboo Against Explicit Causal Inference in
Nonexperimental Psychology, 15 PERSPS. PSYCH. SCI. 1243, 1247, 1253 (2020).
211. See Lewis, supra note 203.
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A second key caveat is that operationalizing the concept of
collective cognitive capital requires resolving difficult questions
about how the relevant collective(s) should be determined. In the
collective aspect of the model, group boundaries are meant to be
fluid, but there are still choices to be made about the boundaries of
such groups and their relative comparison to groups on which
relevant data exists. These choices may ultimately be political, and
the subject of hidden assumptions and judgments about degrees or
kinds of similarities between reference groups and populations
subject to a given policy. For broadly applicable laws, the determination of the most impacted group to assess may be subject to
interest group capture.
C. Risks
The risks inherent in even the best possible version of collective
cognitive capital are many. First, it may prove impossible to keep
the model truly collective in a highly individualistic culture such as
the United States.212 The metric could become individualized and
tempting to use as a way to rank or prioritize individuals. This could
present a particular “group-to-individual” inference risk of a normative character if it becomes descriptively possible to treat cognitive
capital as a diagnostic component. This would present a genuine
problem if an individual’s capacity and plasticity mechanisms
became discernible such that it was possible to determine whether
someone had reached or not reached their full “cognitive capital”
potential. If that were to become the case, which seems scientifically
unlikely even for decades, there are then obvious risks that the
collective concept of cognitive capital would become obscured by
individualized metrics, with implications for individual agency and
freedom to choose one’s life course.
Moreover, even if the concept is resistant to being individualized,
there exists the risk of stigmatization of groups with perceived low
collective cognitive capital relative to other groups. This risk would
persist in spite of the fact that the true measure of policy impact on
collective cognitive capital is one of change from a present value and
212. See, e.g., GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES
150 (abr. ed. 1984).
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not of absolute value against a norm. This, however, is not a usual
feature of “indicators” as a tool of governance; they are typically
used for evaluative purposes.213 But these risks exist whether or not
we attempt to use some collective measure or “indicator” of cognitive
capital as a policy tool, as it seems likely that some other “scientific”
measure would arise. There is a dark and recent history of scientific
justifications for moral atrocities. And the phenomenon is not just
historical; active proponents of “social selection” theories still
(mis)interpret biological evidence to justify structual social marginalization.214 The short space given to discussion of this risk is not
meant to minimize its seriousness, but it is one that is ubiquitous
when social and biological sciences are applied to societal problems
and deserving of separate and extensive treatment.
A further risk is the perception that any project focused on
“brains” is inherently essentializing, medicalizing, and pathologizing what are complex human experiences. This may be because of
deep cultural tendencies to think in terms of dichotomies such as
nature or nuture, biological or social, internal or external, and even
residual dualist ideas about mind or brain. But these dualities
misunderstand the nuanced, complex nature of how the brain works
and how brain and behavioral science, taken as a whole, proceeds.
Brains adapt to the environment; environments and experiences
deeply, importantly influence brain function in ways both short
term and long term. Each of these assumed dualities is really a
both/and rather than an either/or proposition: there is no inexorable
drive towards essentializing humans as “mere” brains, cells and
fluids and electricity. Neuroscience and behavioral science are not
inherently reductionist, and instead are made up of parallel,
213. See Davis et al., supra note 66, at 73-75 (defining an “indicator” as “a named collection
of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different
units. The data are generated through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex
social phenomenon. The data, in this simplified and processed form, are capable of being used
to compare particular units of analysis … synchronically or over time, and to evaluate their
performance by reference to one or more standards.”).
214. See generally KATHRYN PAIGE HARDEN, THE GENETIC LOTTERY: WHY DNA MATTERS
FOR SOCIAL EQUALITY (2021) (cataloging contemporary conservative “social selection” theorists
and explaining why their interpretation of heritability of IQ and educational attainment
misunderstands the science and is incorrectly deterministic). On the biopolitics of race, see
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RECREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011).
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multilevel approaches to understanding different mechanisms.215
This, however, is a nuanced and difficult concept that may be overridden by powerful impulses towards binary thinking.
Finally, though this proposal is conceived as a method of engaging
neoliberal capitalist policy discourse on its own terms, with
technocratic appeal but emphasizing the importance of the collective
and structural, the packaging is no guarantee it would be received
that way. Instead of subverting discourse about the nature of the
capitalistic political economy, collective cognitive capital could be
misappropriated to reify it, falling prey to existing powerful
forces.216 This would be a version of the risks of substituting “a
discourse of science for a discourse of justice.”217 What we fundamentally need are discussions about substantive political priorities
and means to decide between them. Collective cognitive capital may
not be sufficient to get us there, because of misplaced optimism in
the general nature of humans as causal agents motivated to collectively pursue meaningful goals and relationships, due to distortions from the individualist, market-driven culture we already
live in.
CONCLUSION
Neuroscience and behavioral sciences are empirical, descriptive
fields (undertaken within a social context); mere data cannot and
does not supply normative justifications for policy making. But
coherent bodies of work in brain and behavioral sciences are
updating and sometimes challenging theories that legitimize existing policy. The future of law and neuroscience should play to the
strengths of basic science research, using aggregated data and
theory-building applied to legislation and policy to strengthen and
improve society. This can be done while the nature of scientific
production itself is questioned and expanded.218 At a minimum,
findings from behavioral and brain science can reframe the harms
215. CARL F. CRAVER, EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC UNITY OF
NEUROSCIENCE (2007).
216. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias’s Failure, 39 BERKELEY J EMP. & LABOR
L. 37, 40 (2018).
217. See, e.g., id. at 39.
218. Lewis, supra note 203.
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inflicted (or tolerated) by societal structures as having concrete,
biological consequences. Such new frameworks, however, must
account for the status quo of the political economy. Just as the law
will have to grapple with improving understanding of human
behavior, so should those new insights be packaged in a way that
the existing structures of the law can digest.
This Article sketches the outlines of a future for law and neuroscience that is both ambitious and quotidian. It argues that brain and
behavioral science should seek to shape citizen-state interactions by
creating a framework to assess policy choices and maximize the
collective cognitive capital of its people. Applying a holistic brain
science framework to analyze and decide how a state interacts with
its citizens—with the normative goal of making their lives better
by improving brain function, cognitive capacity, and thus autonomy and freedom—is an aggressive goal for the future of neuroscience in law.

